First Welfare Theorem *

Julian Parsert Cezary Kaliszyk

February 23, 2021

Abstract

Contents

*This work is supported by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) project P26201 and the European Research Council (ERC) grant no 714034 *SMART*.

1 Introducing Syntax

Syntax, abbreviations and type-synonyms

theory *Syntax*
imports *Main*
begin

type-synonym $'a$ *relation* $= ('a \times 'a)$ *set*

abbreviation *gen-weak-stx* :: $'a \Rightarrow 'a$ *relation* $\Rightarrow 'a \Rightarrow$ *bool*
(- $\succeq$[-] - [*51,100,51*] *60*)
where
$x \succeq[P]\ y \equiv (x, y) \in P$

abbreviation *gen-indif-stx* :: $'a \Rightarrow 'a$ *relation* $\Rightarrow 'a \Rightarrow$ *bool*
(- $\approx$[-] - [*51,100,51*] *60*)
where
$x \approx[P]\ y \equiv x \succeq[P]\ y \wedge y \succeq[P]\ x$

abbreviation *gen-strc-stx* :: *'a ⇒ 'a relation ⇒ 'a ⇒ bool*
(- ≻[-] - [*51,100,51*] *60*)
where
x ≻[P] y ≡ x ≽[P] y ∧ ¬y ≽[P] x

end

2 Arg Min and Arg Max sets

theory *Argmax*
imports
Complex-Main
begin

2.1 Definitions and Lemmas by Julian Parsert

definition of argmax and argmin returing a set.

definition *arg-min-set* :: (*'a ⇒ 'b*::*ord*) ⇒ *'a set ⇒ 'a set*
where
arg-min-set f S = {*x*. *is-arg-min f* (λ*x*. *x*∈*S*) *x*}

definition *arg-max-set* :: (*'a ⇒ 'b*::*ord*) ⇒ *'a set ⇒ 'a set*
where
arg-max-set f S = {*x*. *is-arg-max f* (λ*x*. *x*∈*S*) *x*}

Useful lemmas for *arg-max-set* and *arg-min-set*.

lemma *no-better-in-s*:
assumes *x* ∈ *arg-max-set f S*
shows ∄ *y*. *y* ∈ *S* ∧ (*f y*) > (*f x*)
by (*metis arg-max-set-def assms is-arg-max-def mem-Collect-eq*)

lemma *argmax-sol-in-s*:
assumes *x* ∈ *arg-max-set f S*
shows *x* ∈ *S*
by (*metis CollectD arg-max-set-def assms is-arg-max-def*)

lemma *leq-all-in-sol*:
fixes *f* :: *'a* ⇒ (*'b* :: *preorder*)
assumes *x* ∈ *arg-max-set f S*
shows ∀ *y* ∈ *S*. *f y* ≥ *f x* ⟶ *y* ∈ *arg-max-set f S*
using *assms le-less-trans* **by** (*auto simp*: *arg-max-set-def is-arg-max-def*)

lemma *all-leq*:
fixes *f* :: *'a* ⇒ (*'b* :: *linorder*)
assumes *x* ∈ *arg-max-set f S*
shows ∀ *y* ∈ *S*. *f x* ≥ *f y*
by (*meson assms leI no-better-in-s*)

lemma *all-in-argmax-equal*:
fixes $f :: 'a \Rightarrow ('b :: linorder)$
assumes $x \in$ *arg-max-set f S*
shows $\forall y \in$ *arg-max-set f S*. $f\ x = f\ y$
by (*meson all-leq argmax-sol-in-s assms le-less no-better-in-s*)

end

3 Preference Relations

Preferences modeled as a set of pairs

theory *Preferences*
imports
HOL−Analysis.Multivariate-Analysis
Syntax
begin

3.1 Basic Preference Relation

Basic preference relation locale with carrier and relation modeled as a set of pairs.

locale *preference* =
fixes *carrier* :: $'a$ *set*
fixes *relation* :: $'a$ *relation*
assumes *not-outside*: $(x,y) \in$ *relation* $\Longrightarrow x \in$ *carrier*
and $(x,y) \in$ *relation* $\Longrightarrow y \in$ *carrier*
assumes *trans-refl*: *preorder-on carrier relation*

context *preference*
begin

abbreviation *geq* (- $\succeq$ - [*51*,*51*] *60*)
where
$x \succeq y \equiv x \succeq$[*relation*] y

abbreviation *str-gr* (- $\succ$ - [*51*,*51*] *60*)
where
$x \succ y \equiv x \succeq y \wedge \neg y \succeq x$

abbreviation *indiff* (- $\approx$ - [*51*,*51*] *60*)
where
$x \approx y \equiv x \succeq y \wedge y \succeq x$

lemma *reflexivity*: *refl-on carrier relation*
using *preorder-on-def trans-refl* **by** *blast*

lemma *transitivity*: *trans relation*
using *preorder-on-def trans-refl* **by** *auto*

lemma *indiff-trans* [*simp*]: $x \approx y \Longrightarrow y \approx z \Longrightarrow x \approx z$
by (*meson transE transitivity*)

end

3.1.1 Contour sets

definition *at-least-as-good* :: *'a* ⇒ *'a set* ⇒ *'a relation* ⇒ *'a set*
where
at-least-as-good x B P = $\{y \in B.\ y \succeq[P]\ x\}$

definition *no-better-than* :: *'a* ⇒ *'a set* ⇒ *'a relation* ⇒ *'a set*
where
no-better-than x B P = $\{y \in B.\ x \succeq[P]\ y\}$

definition *as-good-as* :: *'a* ⇒ *'a set* ⇒ *'a relation* ⇒ *'a set*
where
as-good-as x B P = $\{y \in B.\ x \approx[P]\ y\}$

lemma *at-lst-asgd-ge*:
assumes $x \in$ *at-least-as-good y B Pr*
shows $x \succeq[Pr]\ y$
using *assms at-least-as-good-def* **by** *fastforce*

lemma *strict-contour-is-diff*:
$\{a \in B.\ a \succ[Pr]\ y\}$ = *at-least-as-good y B Pr* − *as-good-as y B Pr*
by(*auto simp add*: *at-least-as-good-def as-good-as-def*)

lemma *strict-countour-def* [*simp*]:
(*at-least-as-good y B Pr*) − *as-good-as y B Pr* = $\{x \in B.\ x \succ[Pr]\ y\}$
by (*simp add*: *as-good-as-def at-least-as-good-def strict-contour-is-diff*)

lemma *at-least-as-goodD* [*dest*]:
assumes $z \in$ *at-least-as-good y B Pr*
shows $z \succeq[Pr]\ y$
using *assms at-least-as-good-def* **by** *fastforce*

3.2 Rational Preference Relation

Rational preferences add totality to the basic preferences.

locale *rational-preference* = *preference* +
assumes *total*: *total-on carrier relation*
begin

lemma *compl*: $\forall x \in$ *carrier* . $\forall y \in$ *carrier* . $x \succeq y \vee y \succeq x$
by (*metis refl-onD reflexivity total total-on-def*)

lemma *strict-not-refl-weak* [*iff*]: $x \in carrier \wedge y \in carrier \Longrightarrow \neg\ (y \succeq x) \longleftrightarrow x \succ y$
by (*metis refl-onD reflexivity total total-on-def*)

lemma *strict-trans* [*simp*]: $x \succ y \Longrightarrow y \succ z \Longrightarrow x \succ z$
by (*meson transE transitivity*)

lemma *completeD* [*dest*]: $x \in carrier \Longrightarrow y \in carrier \Longrightarrow x \neq y \Longrightarrow x \succeq y \vee y \succeq x$
by *blast*

lemma *pref-in-at-least-as*:
assumes $x \succeq y$
shows $x \in$ *at-least-as-good y carrier relation*
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *lifting*) *CollectI assms*
at-least-as-good-def preference.not-outside preference-axioms)

lemma *worse-in-no-better*:
assumes $x \succeq y$
shows $y \in$ *no-better-than y carrier relation*
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *lifting*) *CollectI assms no-better-than-def*
preference-axioms preference-def strict-not-refl-weak)

lemma *strict-is-neg-transitive* :
assumes $x \in carrier \wedge y \in carrier \wedge z \in carrier$
shows $x \succ y \Longrightarrow x \succ z \vee z \succ y$
by (*meson assms compl transE transitivity*)

lemma *weak-is-transitive*:
assumes $x \in carrier \wedge y \in carrier \wedge z \in carrier$
shows $x \succeq y \Longrightarrow y \succeq z \Longrightarrow x \succeq z$
by (*meson transD transitivity*)

lemma *no-better-than-nonepty*:
assumes $carrier \neq \{\}$
shows $\bigwedge x.\ x \in carrier \Longrightarrow$ (*no-better-than x carrier relation*) $\neq \{\}$
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *lifting*) *empty-iff mem-Collect-eq*
no-better-than-def refl-onD reflexivity)

lemma *no-better-subset-pref* :
assumes $x \succeq y$
shows *no-better-than y carrier relation* $\subseteq$ *no-better-than x carrier relation*
proof
fix *a*
assume $a \in$ *no-better-than y carrier relation*
then show $a \in$ *no-better-than x carrier relation*
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *lifting*) *assms mem-Collect-eq no-better-than-def transE transitivity*)

qed

lemma *no-better-thansubset-rel* :
assumes $x \in$ *carrier* **and** $y \in$ *carrier*
assumes *no-better-than y carrier relation* $\subseteq$ *no-better-than x carrier relation*
shows $x \succeq y$
proof −
have $\{a \in$ *carrier*. $y \succeq a\} \subseteq \{a \in$ *carrier*. $x \succeq a\}$
by (*metis* (*no-types*) *assms*(*3*) *no-better-than-def*)
then show *?thesis*
by (*metis* (*mono-tags*, *lifting*) *Collect-mono-iff assms*(*2*) *compl*)
qed

lemma *nbt-nest* :
shows (*no-better-than y carrier relation* $\subseteq$ *no-better-than x carrier relation*) $\vee$
(*no-better-than x carrier relation* $\subseteq$ *no-better-than y carrier relation*)
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *lifting*) *CollectD compl no-better-subset-pref no-better-than-def not-outside subsetI*)

lemma *at-lst-asgd-not-ge*:
assumes *carrier* $\neq \{\}$
assumes $x \in$ *carrier* **and** $y \in$ *carrier*
assumes $x \notin$ *at-least-as-good y carrier relation*
shows $\neg\ x \succeq y$
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *lifting*) *CollectI assms*(*2*) *assms*(*4*) *at-least-as-good-def*)

lemma *as-good-as-sameIff*[*iff*]:
$z \in$ *as-good-as y carrier relation* $\longleftrightarrow z \succeq y \wedge y \succeq z$
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *lifting*) *as-good-as-def mem-Collect-eq not-outside*)

lemma *same-at-least-as-equal*:
assumes $z \approx y$
shows *at-least-as-good z carrier relation* =
at-least-as-good y carrier relation (**is** *?az* = *?ay*)
proof
have $z \in$ *carrier* $\wedge$ $y \in$ *carrier*
by (*meson assms refl-onD2 reflexivity*)
moreover have $\forall x \in$ *carrier*. $x \succeq z \longrightarrow x \succeq y$
by (*meson assms transD transitivity*)
ultimately show *?az* $\subseteq$ *?ay*
by (*metis at-lst-asgd-ge at-lst-asgd-not-ge*
equals0D not-outside subsetI)
next
have $z \in$ *carrier* $\wedge$ $y \in$ *carrier*
by (*meson assms refl-onD2 reflexivity*)
moreover have $\forall x \in$ *carrier*. $x \succeq y \longrightarrow x \succeq z$
by (*meson assms transD transitivity*)
ultimately show *?ay* $\subseteq$ *?az*
by (*metis at-lst-asgd-ge at-lst-asgd-not-ge*

equals0D not-outside subsetI)
qed

lemma *as-good-asIff* [*iff*]:
x ∈ *as-good-as y carrier relation* ⟷ *x* ≈[*relation*] *y*
by *blast*

lemma *nbt-subset*:
assumes *finite carrier*
assumes *x* ∈ *carrier* **and** *y* ∈ *carrier*
shows *no-better-than x carrier relation* ⊆ *no-better-than x carrier relation* ∨
no-better-than x carrier relation ⊆ *no-better-than x carrier relation*
by *auto*

lemma *fnt-carrier-fnt-rel*: *finite carrier* ⟹ *finite relation*
by (*metis finite-SigmaI refl-on-def reflexivity rev-finite-subset*)

lemma *nbt-subset-carrier*:
assumes *x* ∈ *carrier*
shows *no-better-than x carrier relation* ⊆ *carrier*
using *no-better-than-def* **by** *fastforce*

lemma *xy-in-eachothers-nbt*:
assumes *x* ∈ *carrier y* ∈ *carrier*
shows *x* ∈ *no-better-than y carrier relation* ∨
y ∈ *no-better-than x carrier relation*
by (*meson assms*(*1*) *assms*(*2*) *contra-subsetD nbt-nest refl-onD reflexivity worse-in-no-better*)

lemma *same-nbt-same-pref*:
assumes *x* ∈ *carrier y* ∈ *carrier*
shows *x* ∈ *no-better-than y carrier relation* ∧
y ∈ *no-better-than x carrier relation* ⟷ *x* ≈ *y*
by (*metis* (*mono-tags*, *lifting*) *CollectD contra-subsetD no-better-subset-pref*
no-better-than-def worse-in-no-better)

lemma *indifferent-imp-weak-pref*:
assumes *x* ≈ *y*
shows *x* ≽ *y y* ≽ *x*
by (*simp add*: *assms*)+

3.3 Finite carrier

context
assumes *finite carrier*
begin

lemma *fnt-carrier-fnt-nbt*:
shows ∀ *x*∈*carrier*. *finite* (*no-better-than x carrier relation*)
proof

fix x
assume $x \in carrier$
then show *finite* (*no-better-than x carrier relation*)
using *finite-subset nbt-subset-carrier* ‹*finite carrier*› **by** *blast*
qed

lemma *nbt-subset-imp-card-leq*:
assumes $x \in carrier$ **and** $y \in carrier$
shows *no-better-than x carrier relation* $\subseteq$ *no-better-than y carrier relation* $\longleftrightarrow$
card (*no-better-than x carrier relation*) $\leq$ *card* (*no-better-than y carrier relation*)
(**is** *?nbt* $\longleftrightarrow$ *?card*)
proof
assume *?nbt*
then show *?card*
by (*simp add*: *assms*(*2*) *card-mono fnt-carrier-fnt-nbt*)
next
assume *?card*
then show *?nbt*
by (*metis assms*(*1*) *card-seteq fnt-carrier-fnt-nbt nbt-nest*)
qed

lemma *card-leq-pref*:
assumes $x \in carrier$ **and** $y \in carrier$
shows *card* (*no-better-than x carrier relation*) $\leq$ *card* (*no-better-than y carrier relation*)
$\longleftrightarrow y \succeq x$
proof (*rule iffI*, *goal-cases*)
case *1*
then show *?case*
using *assms*(*1*) *assms*(*2*) *nbt-subset-imp-card-leq no-better-thansubset-rel* **by** *presburger*
next
case *2*
then show *?case*
using *assms*(*1*) *assms*(*2*) *nbt-subset-imp-card-leq no-better-subset-pref* **by** *blast*
qed

lemma *finite-ne-remove-induct*:
assumes *finite B* $B \neq \{\}$
$\bigwedge A.$ *finite* $A \implies A \subseteq B \implies A \neq \{\} \implies$
$(\bigwedge x.\ x \in A \implies A - \{x\} \neq \{\} \implies P\ (A - \{x\})) \implies P\ A$
shows $P\ B$
by (*metis assms finite-remove-induct*[**where** $P = \lambda F.\ F = \{\} \vee P\ F$ **for** P])

lemma *finite-nempty-preorder-has-max*:
assumes *finite B* $B \neq \{\}$ *refl-on B R trans R total-on B R*
shows $\exists\, x \in B.\ \forall\, y \in B.\ (x, y) \in R$
using *assms*(*1*) *subset-refl*[*of B*] *assms*(*2*)

proof (*induct B rule*: *finite-subset-induct*)
case (*insert x F*)
then show *?case* **using** *assms*(*3*−)
by (*cases F* = {}) (*auto simp*: *refl-onD total-on-def*, *metis refl-onD2 transE*)
qed *auto*

lemma *finite-nempty-preorder-has-min*:
assumes *finite B B* ≠ {} *refl-on B R trans R total-on B R*
shows ∃ *x* ∈ *B*. ∀ *y* ∈ *B*. (*y*, *x*) ∈ *R*
using *assms*(*1*) *subset-refl*[*of B*] *assms*(*2*)
proof (*induct B rule*: *finite-subset-induct*)
case (*insert x F*)
then show *?case* **using** *assms*(*3*−)
by (*cases F* = {}) (*auto simp*: *refl-onD total-on-def*, *metis refl-onD2 transE*)
qed *auto*

lemma *finite-nonempty-carrier-has-maximum*:
assumes *carrier* ≠ {}
shows ∃ *e* ∈ *carrier*. ∀ *m* ∈ *carrier*. *e* ≽[*relation*] *m*
using *finite-nempty-preorder-has-max*[*of carrier relation*] *assms*
‹*finite carrier*› *reflexivity total transitivity* **by** *blast*

lemma *finite-nonempty-carrier-has-minimum*:
assumes *carrier* ≠ {}
shows ∃ *e* ∈ *carrier*. ∀ *m* ∈ *carrier*. *m* ≽[*relation*] *e*
using *finite-nempty-preorder-has-min*[*of carrier relation*] *assms*
‹*finite carrier*› *reflexivity total transitivity* **by** *blast*

end

lemma *all-carrier-ex-sub-rel*:
∀ *c* ⊆ *carrier*. ∃ *r* ⊆ *relation*. *rational-preference c r*
proof (*standard*,*standard*)
fix *c*
assume *c-in*: *c* ⊆ *carrier*
define *r′* **where**
r′ = {(*x*,*y*) ∈ *relation*. *x* ∈ *c* ∧ *y* ∈ *c*}
have *r′-sub*: *r′* ⊆ *c* × *c*
using *r′-def* **by** *blast*
have ∀ *x* ∈ *c*. *x* ≽[*r′*] *x*
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *lifting*) *CollectI c-in case-prodI compl r′-def subsetCE*)
then have *refl*: *refl-on c r′*
by (*meson r′-sub refl-onI*)
have *trans*: *trans r′*
proof
fix *x y z*
assume *a1*: *x* ≽[*r′*] *y*
assume *a2*: *y* ≽[*r′*] *z*

show $x \succeq[r'] z$
by (*metis* (*mono-tags*, *lifting*) *CollectD CollectI a1 a2 case-prodD case-prodI r′-def transE transitivity*)
qed
have *total*: *total-on c r′*
proof (*standard*)
fix *x y*
assume *a1*:$x \in c$
assume *a2*: $y \in c$
assume *a3*: $x \neq y$
show $x \succeq[r'] y \vee y \succeq[r'] x$
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *lifting*) *CollectI a1 a2 c-in case-prodI compl r′-def subset-iff*)
qed
have *rational-preference c r′*
by (*meson local.refl local.trans preference.intro preorder-on-def rational-preference.intro rational-preference-axioms.intro refl-on-domain total*)
thus $\exists r{\subseteq}$*relation*. *rational-preference c r*
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *lifting*) *CollectD case-prodD r′-def subrelI*)
qed

end

3.4 Local Non-Satiation

Defining local non-satiation.

definition *local-nonsatiation*
where
local-nonsatiation B P $\longleftrightarrow$
$(\forall x{\in}B.\ \forall e{>}0.\ \exists y{\in}B.\ norm\ (y - x) \leq e \wedge y \succ[P]\ x)$

Alternate definitions and intro/dest rules with them

lemma *lns-alt-def1* [*iff*] :
shows *local-nonsatiation B P* $\longleftrightarrow$ $(\forall x \in B.\ \forall e{>}0.\ (\exists y \in B.\ dist\ y\ x \leq e \wedge y \succ[P]\ x))$
by(*simp add* : *dist-norm local-nonsatiation-def*)

lemma *lns-normI* [*intro*]:
assumes $\bigwedge x\ e.\ x \in B \Longrightarrow e > 0 \Longrightarrow (\exists y{\in}B.\ norm\ (y - x) \leq e \wedge y \succ[P]\ x)$
shows *local-nonsatiation B P*
by (*simp add*: *assms dist-norm*)

lemma *lns-distI* [*intro*]:
assumes $\bigwedge x\ e.\ x \in B \Longrightarrow e > 0 \Longrightarrow (\exists y{\in}B.\ (dist\ y\ x) \leq e \wedge y \succ[P]\ x)$
shows *local-nonsatiation B P*
by (*meson lns-alt-def1 assms*)

lemma *lns-alt-def2* [*iff*]:

local-nonsatiation B P $\longleftrightarrow$ ($\forall\, x{\in}B.\ \forall\, e{>}0.\ (\exists\, y.\ \ y \in (\mathit{ball}\ x\ e) \wedge y \in B \wedge y \succ[P]\ x)$)
proof
assume *local-nonsatiation B P*
then show $\forall\, x{\in}B.\ \forall\, e{>}0.\ \exists\, x'.\ x' \in \mathit{ball}\ x\ e \wedge x' \in B \wedge x' \succ[P]\ x$
by (*auto simp add* : *ball-def*) (*metis dense le-less-trans dist-commute*)
next
assume $\forall\, x{\in}B.\ \forall\, e{>}0.\ \exists\, y.\ y \in \mathit{ball}\ x\ e \wedge y \in B \wedge y \succ[P]\ x$
then show *local-nonsatiation B P*
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *lifting*) *ball-def dist-commute*
less-le-not-le lns-alt-def1 mem-Collect-eq)
qed

lemma *lns-normD* [*dest*]:
assumes *local-nonsatiation B P*
shows $\forall\, x \in B.\ \forall\, e{>}0.\ \exists\, y \in B.\ (\mathit{norm}\ (y - x) \leq e \wedge y \succ[P]\ x)$
by (*meson assms local-nonsatiation-def*)

3.5 Convex preferences

definition *weak-convex-pref* :: (*'a*::*real-vector*) *relation* $\Rightarrow$ *bool*
where
weak-convex-pref Pr $\longleftrightarrow$ ($\forall\, x\ y.\ x \succeq[Pr]\ y \longrightarrow$
($\forall\, \alpha\ \beta.\ \alpha + \beta = 1 \wedge \alpha > 0 \wedge \beta > 0 \longrightarrow \alpha *_R x + \beta *_R y \succeq[Pr]\ y$))

definition *convex-pref* :: (*'a*::*real-vector*) *relation* $\Rightarrow$ *bool*
where
convex-pref Pr $\longleftrightarrow$ ($\forall\, x\ y.\ x \succ[Pr]\ y \longrightarrow$
($\forall\, \alpha.\ 1 > \alpha \wedge \alpha > 0 \longrightarrow \alpha *_R x + (1{-}\alpha) *_R y \succ[Pr]\ y$))

definition *strict-convex-pref* :: (*'a*::*real-vector*) *relation* $\Rightarrow$ *bool*
where
strict-convex-pref Pr $\longleftrightarrow$ ($\forall\, x\ y.\ x \succeq[Pr]\ y \wedge x \neq y \longrightarrow$
($\forall\, \alpha.\ 1 > \alpha \wedge \alpha > 0 \longrightarrow \alpha *_R x + (1{-}\alpha) *_R y \succ[Pr]\ y$))

lemma *convex-ge-imp-conved*:
assumes $\forall\, x\ y.\ x \succeq[Pr]\ y \longrightarrow (\forall\, \alpha\ \beta.\ \alpha + \beta = 1 \wedge \alpha \geq 0 \wedge \beta \geq 0 \longrightarrow \alpha *_R x + \beta *_R y \succeq[Pr]\ y)$
shows *weak-convex-pref Pr*
by (*simp add*: *assms weak-convex-pref-def*)

lemma *weak-convexI* [*intro*]:
assumes $\bigwedge x\ y\ \alpha\ \beta.\ x \succeq[Pr]\ y \Longrightarrow \alpha + \beta = 1 \Longrightarrow 0 < \alpha \Longrightarrow 0 < \beta \Longrightarrow \alpha *_R x + \beta *_R y \succeq[Pr]\ y$
shows *weak-convex-pref Pr*
by (*simp add*: *assms weak-convex-pref-def*)

lemma *weak-convexD* [*dest*]:
assumes *weak-convex-pref Pr* **and** $x \succeq[Pr]\ y$ **and** $0 < u$ **and** $0 < v$ **and** $u + v$

= 1
shows $u *_R x + v *_R y \succeq[Pr] y$
using *assms weak-convex-pref-def* **by** *blast*

3.6 Real Vector Preferences

Preference relations on real vector type class.

locale *real-vector-rpr = rational-preference carrier relation*
for *carrier* :: *'a*::*real-vector set*
and *relation* :: *'a relation*

sublocale *real-vector-rpr* $\subseteq$ *rational-preference carrier relation*
by (*simp add*: *rational-preference-axioms*)

context *real-vector-rpr*
begin

lemma *have-rpr*: *rational-preference carrier relation*
by (*simp add*: *rational-preference-axioms*)

Multiple convexity alternate definitions intro/dest rules.

lemma *weak-convex1D* [*dest*]:
assumes *weak-convex-pref relation* **and** $x \succeq[relation] y$ **and** $0 \leq u$ **and** $0 \leq v$
and $u + v = 1$
shows $u *_R x + v *_R y \succeq[relation] y$
proof−
have *u-0*: $u = 0 \longrightarrow u *_R x + v *_R y \succeq[relation] y$
proof
assume *u-0*: $u = 0$
have $v = 1$
using *assms*(*5*) *u-0* **by** *auto*
then have *?thesis*
by (*metis add.left-neutral assms*(*2*) *preference.reflexivity preference-axioms*
real-vector.scale-zero-left refl-onD2 scaleR-one strict-not-refl-weak)
thus $u *_R x + v *_R y \succeq[relation] y$
using *u-0* **by** *blast*
qed
have $u \neq 0 \wedge u \neq 1 \longrightarrow u *_R x + v *_R y \succeq[relation] y$
by (*metis add-cancel-right-right antisym-conv not-le assms weak-convexD*)
then show *?thesis*
by (*metis u-0 assms*(*2*,*5*) *add-cancel-right-right real-vector.scale-zero-left scaleR-one*)
qed

lemma *weak-convex1I* [*intro*] :
assumes $\forall x.$ *convex* (*at-least-as-good x carrier relation*)
shows *weak-convex-pref relation*
proof (*rule weak-convexI*)
fix *x* **and** *y* **and** α β :: *real*
assume *assum* : $x \succeq[relation] y$

assume *reals*: $0 < \alpha$ $0 < \beta$ $\alpha + \beta = 1$
then have $x \in$ *carrier*
by (*meson assum preference.not-outside rational-preference.axioms(1) have-rpr*)
have $y \in$ *carrier*
by (*meson assum refl-onD2 reflexivity*)
then have *y-in-upper-cont*: $y \in$ (*at-least-as-good y carrier relation*)
using *assms rational-preference.at-lst-asgd-not-ge*
rational-preference.compl **by** (*metis empty-iff have-rpr*)
then have $x \in$ (*at-least-as-good y carrier relation*)
using *assum pref-in-at-least-as* **by** *blast*
moreover have $0 \leq \beta$ **and** $0 \leq \alpha$
using *reals* **by** (*auto*)
ultimately show ($\alpha *_R x + \beta *_R y$) $\succeq$[*relation*] *y*
by (*meson assms(1) at-least-as-goodD convexD reals(3) y-in-upper-cont*)
qed

Definition of convexity in "Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare"[1].

lemma *convex-def-alt*:
assumes *rational-preference carrier relation*
assumes *weak-convex-pref relation*
shows ($\forall x \in$ *carrier*. *convex* (*at-least-as-good x carrier relation*))
proof
fix *x*
assume *x-in*: $x \in$ *carrier*
show *convex* (*at-least-as-good x carrier relation*) (**is** *convex ?x*)
proof (*rule convexI*)
fix *a b* :: *'a* **and** α :: *real* **and** β :: *real*
assume *a-in*: $a \in$ *?x*
assume *b-in*: $b \in$ *?x*
assume *reals*: $0 \leq \alpha$ $0 \leq \beta$ $\alpha + \beta = 1$
have *a-g-x*: $a \succeq$[*relation*] *x*
using *a-in* **by** *blast*
have *b-g-x*: $b \succeq$[*relation*] *x*
using *b-in* **by** *blast*
have $a \succeq$[*relation*] $b \vee b \succeq$[*relation*] *a*
by (*meson a-in at-least-as-goodD b-in preference.not-outside*
rational-preference.compl rational-preference-def assms(1))
then show $\alpha *_R a + \beta *_R b \in$ *?x*
proof(*rule disjE*)
assume $a \succeq$[*relation*] *b*
then have $\alpha *_R a + \beta *_R b \succeq$[*relation*] *b*
using *assms reals* **by** *blast*
then have $\alpha *_R a + \beta *_R b \succeq$[*relation*] *x*
by (*meson b-g-x assms(1) preference.not-outside x-in*
rational-preference.strict-is-neg-transitive
rational-preference.strict-not-refl-weak rational-preference-def)
then show *?thesis*
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *lifting*) *CollectI assms(1)*
at-least-as-good-def preference-def rational-preference-def)

```
    next
      assume as: b ≽[relation] a
      then have α *R a + β *R b ≽[relation] a
        by (metis add.commute assms(2) reals weak-convex1D)
      have α *R a + β *R b ≽[relation] a
        by (metis as add.commute  assms(2)
            reals(1,2,3) weak-convex1D)
      then have α *R a + β *R b ≽[relation] x
        by (meson a-g-x assms(1) preference.indiff-trans x-in
            preference.not-outside rational-preference.axioms(1)
            rational-preference.strict-is-neg-transitive )
      then show ?thesis
        using pref-in-at-least-as by blast
    qed
  qed
qed

lemma convex-imp-convex-str-upper-cnt:
  assumes ∀ x ∈ carrier. convex (at-least-as-good x carrier relation)
  shows convex (at-least-as-good x carrier relation − as-good-as x carrier relation)
    (is convex ( ?a − ?b))
proof (rule convexI)
  fix a y u v
  assume as-a: a ∈ ?a − ?b
  assume as-y: y ∈ ?a − ?b
  assume reals: 0 ≤ (u::real) 0 ≤ v u + v = 1
  have cvx: weak-convex-pref relation
    by (meson assms at-least-as-goodD convexI have-rpr
        preference-def rational-preference.axioms(1) weak-convex1I)
  then have a-g-x: a ≻[relation] x
    using as-a by blast
  then have y-gt-x: y ≻[relation] x
    using as-y by blast
  show u *R a + v *R y ∈ ?a − ?b
  proof
    show u *R a + v *R y ∈ ?a
      by (metis DiffD1 a-g-x as-a as-y assms convexD reals have-rpr
          preference-def rational-preference.axioms(1))
  next
    have a ≽[relation] y ∨ y ≽[relation] a
      by (meson a-g-x y-gt-x assms(1) preference.not-outside have-rpr
          rational-preference.axioms(1) rational-preference.strict-not-refl-weak)
    then show u *R a + v *R y ∉ ?b
    proof
      assume a ≽[relation] y
      then have u *R a + v *R y ≽[relation] y
        using cvx assms(1) reals by blast
      then have u *R a + v *R y ≻[relation] x
        using y-gt-x by (meson assms(1) rational-preference.axioms(1) have-rpr
```

rational-preference.strict-is-neg-transitive preference-def)
then show $u *_R a + v *_R y \notin$ *as-good-as x carrier relation*
by *blast*
next
assume $y \succeq$[*relation*] *a*
then have $u *_R a + v *_R y \succeq$[*relation*] *a*
using *cvx assms*(*1*) *reals* **by** (*metis add.commute weak-convex1D*)
then have $u *_R a + v *_R y \succ$[*relation*] *x*
by (*meson a-g-x assms*(*1*) *rational-preference.strict-is-neg-transitive*
rational-preference.axioms(*1*) *preference-def have-rpr*)
then show $u *_R a + v *_R y \notin$ *?b*
by *blast*
qed
qed
qed

end

3.6.1 Monotone preferences

definition *weak-monotone-prefs* :: *'a set* ⇒ (*'a*::*ord*) *relation* ⇒ *bool*
where
weak-monotone-prefs B P ⟷ (∀ *x* ∈ *B*. ∀ *y* ∈ *B*. *x* ≥ *y* ⟶ *x* ≽[*P*]*y*)

definition *monotone-preference* :: *'a set* ⇒ (*'a*::*ord*) *relation* ⇒ *bool*
where
monotone-preference B P ⟷ (∀ *x* ∈ *B*. ∀ *y* ∈ *B*. *x* > *y* ⟶ *x* ≻[*P*] *y*)

Given a carrier set that is unbounded above (not the "standard" mathematical definition), monotonicity implies local non-satiation.

lemma *unbounded-above-mono-imp-lns*:
assumes ∀ *M* ∈ *carrier*. (∀ *x* > *M*. *x* ∈ *carrier*)
assumes *mono*: *monotone-preference* (*carrier*:: *'a*::*ordered-euclidean-space set*) *relation*
shows *local-nonsatiation carrier relation*
proof(*rule lns-distI*)
fix *x* **and** *e*::*real*
assume *x-in*: *x* ∈ *carrier*
assume *gz* : *e* > *0*
show ∃ *y*∈*carrier*. *dist y x* ≤ *e* ∧ *y* ≽[*relation*] *x* ∧ (*x*, *y*) ∉ *relation*
proof–
obtain *v* :: *real* **where**
v:*v* < *e 0* < *v* **using** *gz dense* **by** *blast*
obtain *i* **where**
i:(*i*::*'a*) ∈ *Basis* **by** *fastforce*
define *y* **where**
y-value : *y* = *x* + *v* *$_R$ *i*
have *ge*:*y* ≥ *x*
using *y-value i* **unfolding** *y-value*

by (*simp add*: *v*(*2*) *zero-le-scaleR-iff*)
have $y \neq x$
using *y-value i* **unfolding** *y-value*
using *v*(*2*) **by** *auto*
hence *y-str-g-x* : $y > x$
using *ge* **by** *auto*
have *y-in*: $y \in$ *carrier*
using *assms*(*1*) *x-in y-str-g-x* **by** *blast*
then have *y-pref-x* : $y \succ$[*relation*] x
using *y-str-g-x x-in mono monotone-preference-def* **by** *blast*
hence *norm* $(y - x) \leq e$
using ‹*0* < *v*› *y-value y-value i v* **by** *auto*
hence *dist-less-e* : *dist y x* $\leq e$
by (*simp add*: *dist-norm*)
thus *?thesis*
using *y-pref-x dist-less-e y-in* **by** *blast*
qed
qed

end

4 Utility Functions

Utility functions and results involving them.

theory *Utility-Functions*
imports
Preferences
begin

4.1 Ordinal utility functions

Ordinal utility function locale

locale *ordinal-utility* =
fixes *carrier* :: *'a set*
fixes *relation* :: *'a relation*
fixes *u* :: *'a* ⇒ *real*
assumes *util-def*[*iff*]: $x \in$ *carrier* ⟹ $y \in$ *carrier* ⟹ $x \succeq$[*relation*] $y \longleftrightarrow u\ x \geq u\ y$
assumes *not-outside*: $x \succeq$[*relation*] $y \Longrightarrow x \in$ *carrier*
and $x \succeq$[*relation*] $y \Longrightarrow y \in$ *carrier*
begin

lemma *util-def-conf*: $x \in$ *carrier* ⟹ $y \in$ *carrier* ⟹ $u\ x \geq u\ y \longleftrightarrow x \succeq$[*relation*] *y*
using *util-def* **by** *blast*

lemma *relation-subset-crossp*:

relation $\subseteq$ *carrier* $\times$ *carrier*
proof
fix *x*
assume *x* $\in$ *relation*
have $\forall$ (*a*,*b*) $\in$ *relation*. *a* $\in$ *carrier* $\wedge$ *b* $\in$ *carrier*
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *lifting*) *case-prod-conv ordinal-utility-axioms ordinal-utility-def surj-pair*)
then show *x* $\in$ *carrier* $\times$ *carrier*
using ‹*x* $\in$ *relation*› **by** *auto*
qed

Utility function implies totality of relation

lemma *util-imp-total*: *total-on carrier relation*
proof
fix *x* **and** *y*
assume *x-inc*: *x* $\in$ *carrier* **and** *y-inc* : *y* $\in$ *carrier*
have *fst* : *u x* $\geq$ *u y* $\vee$ *u y* $\geq$ *u x*
using *util-def* **by** *auto*
then show *x* $\succeq$[*relation*] *y* $\vee$ *y* $\succeq$[*relation*] *x*
by (*simp add*: *x-inc y-inc*)
qed

lemma *x-y-in-carrier*: *x* $\succeq$[*relation*] *y* $\Longrightarrow$ *x* $\in$ *carrier* $\wedge$ *y* $\in$ *carrier*
by (*meson ordinal-utility-axioms ordinal-utility-def*)

Utility function implies transitivity of relation.

lemma *util-imp-trans*: *trans relation*
proof (*rule transI*)
fix *x* **and** *y* **and** *z*
assume *x-y*: *x* $\succeq$[*relation*] *y*
assume *y-z*: *y* $\succeq$[*relation*] *z*
have *x-ge-y*: *x* $\succeq$[*relation*] *y*
using *x-y* **by** *auto*
then have *x-y*: *u x* $\geq$ *u y*
by (*meson x-y-in-carrier ordinal-utility-axioms util-def x-y*)
have *u y* $\geq$ *u z*
by (*meson y-z ordinal-utility-axioms ordinal-utility-def*)
have *x* $\in$ *carrier*
using *x-y-in-carrier*[*of x y*] *x-ge-y* **by** *simp*
then have *u x* $\geq$ *u z*
using ‹*u z* $\leq$ *u y*› *order-trans x-y* **by** *blast*
hence *x* $\succeq$[*relation*] *z*
by (*meson* ‹*x* $\in$ *carrier*› *ordinal-utility-axioms ordinal-utility-def y-z*)
then show *x* $\succeq$[*relation*] *z* **.**
qed

lemma *util-imp-refl*: *refl-on carrier relation*
by (*simp add*: *refl-on-def relation-subset-crossp*)

lemma *affine-trans-is-u*:
shows $\forall \alpha{>}0.\ (\forall \beta.$ *ordinal-utility carrier relation* $(\lambda x.\ u(x){*}\alpha + \beta))$
proof (*rule allI*, *rule impI*, *rule allI*)
fix α::*real* **and** β
assume $*{:}\alpha > 0$
show *ordinal-utility carrier relation* $(\lambda x.\ u\ x * \alpha + \beta)$
proof (*subst ordinal-utility-def*, *rule conjI*, *goal-cases*)
case *1*
then show *?case*
by (*metis* $*$ *add.commute add-le-cancel-left not-le mult-less-iff1 util-def-conf*)
next
case *2*
then show *?case*
by (*meson refl-on-domain util-imp-refl*)
qed
qed

This utility function definition is ordinal. Hence they are only unique up to a monotone transformation.

lemma *ordinality-of-utility-function* :
fixes f :: *real* $\Rightarrow$ *real*
assumes *monot*: *monotone* $(>)$ $(>)$ f
shows $(f \circ u)\ x > (f \circ u)\ y \longleftrightarrow u\ x > u\ y$
proof −
let *?func* $= (\lambda x.\ f(u\ x))$
have $\forall\, m\ n\ .\ u\ m \geq u\ n \longleftrightarrow$ *?func* $m \geq$ *?func* n
by (*metis le-less monot monotone-def not-less*)
hence $u\ x > u\ y \longleftrightarrow$ *?func* $x >$ *?func* y
using *not-le* **by** *blast*
thus *?thesis* **by** *auto*
qed

corollary *utility-prefs-corresp* :
fixes f :: *real* $\Rightarrow$ *real*
assumes *monotonicity* : *monotone* $(>)$ $(>)$ f
shows $\forall\, x{\in}$*carrier*. $\forall\, y{\in}$*carrier*. $(x,y) \in$ *relation* $\longleftrightarrow (f \circ u)\ x \geq (f \circ u)\ y$
by (*meson monotonicity not-less ordinality-of-utility-function util-def-conf*)

corollary *monotone-comp-is-utility*:
fixes f :: *real* $\Rightarrow$ *real*
assumes *monot*: *monotone* $(>)$ $(>)$ f
shows *ordinal-utility carrier relation* $(f \circ u)$
proof (*rule ordinal-utility.intro*, *goal-cases*)
case (*1 x y*)
then show *?case*
using *monot utility-prefs-corresp* **by** *blast*
next
case (*2 x y*)
then show *?case*

using *not-outside* **by** *blast*
next
case (*3 x y*)
then show *?case*
using *x-y-in-carrier* **by** *blast*
qed

lemma *ordinal-utility-left*:
assumes $x \succeq[relation]\ y$
shows $u\ x \geq u\ y$
using *assms x-y-in-carrier* **by** *blast*

lemma *add-right*:
assumes $\bigwedge x\ y.\ x \succeq[relation]\ y \Longrightarrow f\ x \geq f\ y$
shows *ordinal-utility carrier relation* $(\lambda x.\ u\ x + f\ x)$
proof (*rule ordinal-utility.intro*, *goal-cases*)
case (*1 x y*)
assume *xy*: $x \in carrier\ y \in carrier$
then show *?case*
proof −
have $u\ x \leq u\ y \longrightarrow (\exists r.\ ((x, y) \notin relation \wedge \neg\ r \leq u\ x + f\ x) \wedge r \leq u\ y + f\ y) \vee u\ y \leq u\ x$
by (*metis* (*no-types*) *add-le-cancel-left add-le-cancel-right assms util-def xy*(*1*) *xy*(*2*))
moreover show *?thesis*
by (*meson add-mono assms calculation le-cases order-trans util-def xy*(*1*) *xy*(*2*))
qed
next
case (*2 x y*)
then show *?case*
using *not-outside* **by** *blast*
next
case (*3 x y*)
then show *?case*
using *x-y-in-carrier* **by** *blast*
qed

lemma *add-left*:
assumes $\bigwedge x\ y.\ x \succeq[relation]\ y \Longrightarrow f\ x \geq f\ y$
shows *ordinal-utility carrier relation* $(\lambda x.\ f\ x + u\ x)$
proof −
have *ordinal-utility carrier relation* $(\lambda x.\ u\ x + f\ x)$
by (*simp add*: *add-right assms*)
thus *?thesis* **using** *Groups.ab-semigroup-add-class.add.commute*
by (*simp add*: *add.commute*)
qed

lemma *ordinal-utility-scale-transl*:
assumes (*c*::*real*) > *0*
shows *ordinal-utility carrier relation* (λ*x*. *c* ∗ (*u x*) + *d*)
proof −
have *monotone* (>) (>) (λ*x*. *c* ∗ *x* + *d*) (**is** *monotone* (>) (>) *?fn*)
by (*simp add*: *assms monotone-def*)
with *monotone-comp-is-utility* **have** *ordinal-utility carrier relation* (*?fn* ∘ *u*)
by *blast*
moreover have *?fn* ∘ *u* = (λ*x*. *c* ∗ (*u x*) + *d*)
by *auto*
finally show *?thesis*
by *auto*
qed

lemma *strict-prefernce-iff-strict-utility*:
assumes *x* ∈ *carrier*
assumes *y* ∈ *carrier*
shows *x* ≻[*relation*] *y* ⟷ *u x* > *u y*
by (*meson assms*(*1*) *assms*(*2*) *less-eq-real-def not-less util-def*)

end

A utility function implies a rational preference relation. Hence a utility function contains exactly the same amount of information as a RPR

sublocale *ordinal-utility* ⊆ *rational-preference carrier relation*
proof
fix *x* **and** *y*
assume *xy*: *x* ≿[*relation*] *y*
then show *x* ∈ *carrier*
and *y* ∈ *carrier*
using *not-outside* **by** (*simp*)
(*meson xy refl-onD2 util-imp-refl*)
next
show *preorder-on carrier relation*
proof–
have *trans relation* **using** *util-imp-trans* **by** *auto*
then have *preorder-on carrier relation*
by (*simp add*: *preorder-on-def util-imp-refl*)
then show *?thesis* **.**
qed
next
show *total-on carrier relation*
by (*simp add*: *util-imp-total*)
qed

Given a finite carrier set. We can guarantee that given a rational preference relation, there must also exist a utility function representing this relation. Construction of witness roughly follows from.

theorem *fnt-carrier-exists-util-fun*:

assumes *finite carrier*
assumes *rational-preference carrier relation*
shows $\exists\, u.$ *ordinal-utility carrier relation u*
proof−
define f **where**
f: $f = (\lambda x.$ *card* (*no-better-than x carrier relation*))
have *ordinal-utility carrier relation f*
proof
fix *x y*
assume *x-c*: $x \in$ *carrier*
assume *y-c*: $y \in$ *carrier*
show $x \succeq$[*relation*] $y \longleftrightarrow$ (*real* (*f y*) $\leq$ *real* (*f x*))
proof
assume *asm*: $x \succeq$[*relation*] y
define *yn* **where**
yn: *yn* = *no-better-than y carrier relation*
define *xn* **where**
xn: *xn* = *no-better-than x carrier relation*
then have *yn* $\subseteq$ *xn*
by (*simp add*: *asm yn assms*(*2*) *rational-preference.no-better-subset-pref*)
then have *card yn* $\leq$ *card xn*
by (*simp add*: *x-c y-c asm assms*(*1*) *assms*(*2*) *rational-preference.card-leq-pref xn yn*)
then show (*real* (*f y*) $\leq$ *real* (*f x*))
using *f xn yn* **by** *simp*
next
assume *real* (*f y*) $\leq$ *real* (*f x*)
then show $x \succeq$[*relation*] y
using *assms*(*1*) *assms*(*2*) *f rational-preference.card-leq-pref x-c y-c* **by** *fastforce*
qed
next
fix *x y*
assume *asm*: $x \succeq$[*relation*] y
show $x \in$ *carrier*
by (*meson asm assms*(*2*) *preference.not-outside rational-preference.axioms*(*1*))
show $y \in$ *carrier*
by (*meson asm assms*(*2*) *preference-def rational-preference-def*)
qed
then show *?thesis*
by *blast*
qed

corollary *obt-u-fnt-carrier*:
assumes *finite carrier*
assumes *rational-preference carrier relation*
obtains *u* **where** *ordinal-utility carrier relation u*
using *assms*(*1*) *assms*(*2*) *fnt-carrier-exists-util-fun* **by** *blast*

theorem *ordinal-util-imp-rat-prefs*:

assumes *ordinal-utility carrier relation u*
shows *rational-preference carrier relation*
by (*metis* (*full-types*) *assms order-on-defs*(*1*) *ordinal-utility.util-imp-refl*
ordinal-utility.util-imp-total ordinal-utility.util-imp-trans ordinal-utility-def
preference.intro rational-preference.intro rational-preference-axioms-def)

4.2 Utility function on Euclidean Space

locale *eucl-ordinal-utility* = *ordinal-utility carrier relation u*
for *carrier* :: ('*a*::*euclidean-space*) *set*
and *relation* :: '*a relation*
and *u* :: '*a* ⇒ *real*

sublocale *eucl-ordinal-utility* ⊆ *rational-preference carrier relation*
using *rational-preference-axioms* **by** *blast*

lemma *ord-eucl-utility-imp-rpr*: *eucl-ordinal-utility s rel u* ⟶ *real-vector-rpr s rel*
using *eucl-ordinal-utility.axioms ordinal-util-imp-rat-prefs real-vector-rpr.intro*
by *blast*

context *eucl-ordinal-utility*
begin

Local non-satiation on utility functions

lemma *lns-pref-lns-util* [*iff*]:
local-nonsatiation carrier relation ⟷
(∀ *x*∈*carrier*. ∀ *e* > *0*. ∃ *y*∈*carrier*.
norm (*y* − *x*) ≤ *e* ∧ *u y* > *u x*) (**is** - ⟷ *?alt*)
proof
assume *lns*: *local-nonsatiation carrier relation*
have ∀ *a b*. *a* ≻ *b* ⟶ *u a* > *u b*
by (*metis less-eq-real-def util-def x-y-in-carrier*)
then show *?alt*
by (*meson lns local-nonsatiation-def*)
next
assume *lns*: *?alt*
show *local-nonsatiation carrier relation*
proof(*rule lns-normI*)
fix *x* **and** *e*::*real*
assume *x-in*: *x* ∈ *carrier*
assume *e*: *e* > *0*
have ∀ *x* ∈ *carrier*. ∀ *e*>*0*. ∃ *y*∈*carrier*. *norm* (*y* − *x*) ≤ *e* ∧ *y* ≻ *x*
by (*meson less-eq-real-def linorder-not-less lns util-def*)
have ∃ *y*∈*carrier*. *norm* (*y* − *x*) ≤ *e* ∧ *u y* > *u x*
using *e x-in lns* **by** *blast*
then show ∃ *y*∈*carrier*. *norm* (*y* − *x*) ≤ *e* ∧ *y* ≻ *x*
by (*meson compl not-less util-def x-in*)
qed

qed

end

lemma *finite-carrier-rpr-iff-u*:
assumes *finite carrier*
and (*relation*::'*a relation*) ⊆ *carrier* × *carrier*
shows *rational-preference carrier relation* ⟷ (∃ *u*. *ordinal-utility carrier relation u*)
proof
assume *rational-preference carrier relation*
then show ∃ *u*. *ordinal-utility carrier relation u*
by (*simp add*: *assms*(*1*) *fnt-carrier-exists-util-fun*)
next
assume ∃ *u*. *ordinal-utility carrier relation u*
then show *rational-preference carrier relation*
by (*metis* (*full-types*) *order-on-defs*(*1*) *ordinal-utility.util-imp-refl*
ordinal-utility.util-imp-total ordinal-utility.util-imp-trans ordinal-utility-def
preference.intro rational-preference-axioms-def rational-preference-def)
qed

end

5 Consumers

Consumption sets

theory *Consumers*
imports
HOL−Analysis.Multivariate-Analysis
../Syntax
begin

5.1 Pre Arrow-Debreu consumption set

It turns out that the First Welfare Theorem does not require any particular limitations on the consumption set

locale *pre-arrow-debreu-consumption-set* =
fixes *consumption-set* :: ('*a*::*euclidean-space*) *set*
assumes *x* ∈ (*UNIV*:: '*a set*) ⟹ *x* ∈ *consumption-set*
begin
end

5.2 Arrow-Debreu model consumption set

The Arrow-Debreu model consumption set includes more and stricter assumptions which are necessary for further results.

locale *gen-pre-arrow-debreu-consum-set* =
  fixes *consumption-set* :: ('*a*::*ordered-euclidean-space*) *set*
begin

end

locale *arrow-debreu-consum-set* =
  fixes *consumption-set* :: ('*a*::*ordered-euclidean-space*) *set*
  assumes *r-plus*: *consumption-set* $\subseteq \{(x::'a).\ x \geq 0\}$
  assumes *closed*: *closed consumption-set*
  assumes *convex*: *convex consumption-set*
  assumes *non-empty*: *consumption-set* $\neq \{\}$
  assumes $\forall\, M \in$ *consumption-set*. $(\forall\, x > M.\ x \in$ *consumption-set*$)$
begin

lemma *x-larger-0*: $x \in$ *consumption-set* $\Longrightarrow x \geq 0$
  using *r-plus* **by** *auto*

lemma *larger-in-consump-set*:
  $x \in$ *consumption-set* $\wedge\ y \geq x \Longrightarrow y \in$ *consumption-set*
  using *arrow-debreu-consum-set-axioms arrow-debreu-consum-set-def*
    dual-order.order-iff-strict **by** *fastforce*

end

end

theory *Common*
  imports
    ../Preferences
    ../Utility-Functions
    ../Argmax
begin

6 Pareto Ordering

Allows us to define a Pareto Ordering.

locale *pareto-ordering* =
  fixes *agents* :: '*i set*
  fixes *U* :: '*i* $\Rightarrow$ '*a* $\Rightarrow$ *real*
begin
notation *U* (*U*[-])

definition *pareto-dominating* (**infix** $\succ$*Pareto* 60)
  where

$X \succ Pareto\ Y \longleftrightarrow$
$(\forall\, i \in agents.\ U[i]\ (X\ i) \geq U[i]\ (Y\ i)) \wedge$
$(\exists\, i \in agents.\ U[i]\ (X\ i) > U[i]\ (Y\ i))$

lemma *trans-strict-pareto*: $X \succ Pareto\ Y \Longrightarrow Y \succ Pareto\ Z \Longrightarrow X \succ Pareto\ Z$
proof −
assume *a1*: $X \succ Pareto\ Y$
assume $Y \succ Pareto\ Z$
then have *f3*: $\forall\, i \in agents.\ U[i]\ (Z\ i) \leq U[i]\ (X\ i)$
by (*meson a1 order-trans pareto-dominating-def*)
moreover have $\exists\, i \in agents.\ \neg\ U[i]\ (X\ i) \leq U[i]\ (Y\ i)$
using *a1 pareto-dominating-def* **by** *fastforce*
ultimately show *?thesis*
by (*metis* ‹$Y \succ Pareto\ Z$› *less-eq-real-def pareto-dominating-def*)
qed

lemma *anti-sym-strict-pareto*: $X \succ Pareto\ Y \Longrightarrow \neg Y \succ Pareto\ X$
using *pareto-dominating-def* **by** *auto*

end

6.1 Budget constraint

Definition returns all afforedable bundles given wealth W

f is a function that computes the value given a bundle

definition *budget-constraint*
where
budget-constraint f S W $= \{x \in S.\ f\ x \leq W\}$

6.2 Feasiblity

definition *feasible-private-ownership*
where
feasible-private-ownership A F $\mathcal{E}$ *Cs Ps X Y* $\longleftrightarrow$
$(\sum i \in A.\ X\ i) \leq (\sum i \in A.\ \mathcal{E}\ i) + (\sum j \in F.\ Y\ j) \wedge$
$(\forall\, i \in A.\ X\ i \in Cs) \wedge (\forall\, j \in F.\ Y\ j \in Ps\ j)$

lemma *feasible-private-ownershipD*:
assumes *feasible-private-ownership A F* $\mathcal{E}$ *Cs Ps X Y*
shows $(\sum i \in A.\ X\ i) \leq (\sum i \in A.\ \mathcal{E}\ i) + (\sum j \in F.\ Y\ j)$
and $(\forall\, i \in A.\ X\ i \in Cs)$ **and** $(\forall\, j \in F.\ Y\ j \in Ps\ j)$
using *assms feasible-private-ownership-def* **apply** *blast*
by (*meson assms feasible-private-ownership-def*)
(*meson assms feasible-private-ownership-def*)

end

theory *Exchange-Economy*
  imports
    ../Preferences
    ../Utility-Functions
    ../Argmax
    Consumers
    Common
begin

7 Exchange Economy

Define the exchange economy model

locale *exchange-economy* =
  fixes *consumption-set* :: ('*a*::*ordered-euclidean-space*) *set*
  fixes *agents* :: '*i set*
  fixes $\mathcal{E}$ :: '*i* ⇒ '*a*
  fixes *Pref* :: '*i* ⇒ '*a relation*
  fixes *U* :: '*i* ⇒ '*a* ⇒ *real*
  assumes *cons-set-props*: *pre-arrow-debreu-consumption-set consumption-set*
  assumes *agent-props*: *i* ∈ *agents* ⟹ *eucl-ordinal-utility consumption-set* (*Pref i*) (*U i*)
  assumes *finite-agents*: *finite agents* **and** *agents* ≠ {}

sublocale *exchange-economy* ⊆ *pareto-ordering agents U*
  .

context *exchange-economy*
begin

context
begin

notation *U* (*U*[-])
notation *Pref* (*Pr*[-])
notation $\mathcal{E}$ ($\mathcal{E}$[-])

lemma *base-pref-is-ord-eucl-rpr*: *i* ∈ *agents* ⟹ *rational-preference consumption-set Pr*[*i*]
  by (*meson exchange-economy.agent-props exchange-economy-axioms ord-eucl-utility-imp-rpr real-vector-rpr.have-rpr*)

private abbreviation *calculate-value*
  where
    calculate-value P x ≡ *P* ⋅ *x*

7.1 Feasibility

definition *feasible-allocation*
where
feasible-allocation A E $\longleftrightarrow$
$(\sum i{\in}agents.\ A\ i) \leq (\sum i{\in}agents.\ E\ i)$

7.2 Pareto optimality

definition *pareto-optimal-endow*
where
pareto-optimal-endow X E $\longleftrightarrow$
(*feasible-allocation X E* $\wedge$
$(\nexists X'.$ *feasible-allocation X' E* $\wedge$ *X'* $\succ$*Pareto X*))

7.3 Competitive Equilibrium in Exchange Economy

Competitive Equilibirum or Walrasian Equilibrium definition.

definition *comp-equilib-endow*
where
comp-equilib-endow P X E $\equiv$
feasible-allocation X E $\wedge$
$(\forall\, i \in$ *agents. X i* $\in$ *arg-max-set U*[*i*]
(*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value P*) *consumption-set* (*P* $\cdot$ *E i*)))

7.4 Lemmas for final result

lemma *utility-function-def*[*iff*]:
assumes $i \in$ *agents*
shows *U*[*i*] *x* $\geq$ *U*[*i*] *y* $\longleftrightarrow$ *x* $\succeq$[*Pr*[*i*]] *y*
proof
have *ordinal-utility consumption-set* (*Pref i*) (*U*[*i*])
using *agent-props assms eucl-ordinal-utility-def* **by** *auto*
then show *U*[*i*] *y* $\leq$ *U*[*i*] *x* $\Longrightarrow$ *x* $\succeq$[*Pref i*] *y*
by (*meson UNIV-I cons-set-props ordinal-utility.util-def-conf pre-arrow-debreu-consumption-set-def*)
next
show *x* $\succeq$[*Pref i*] *y* $\Longrightarrow$ *U*[*i*] *y* $\leq$ *U*[*i*] *x*
by (*meson agent-props assms ordinal-utility-def eucl-ordinal-utility-def*)
qed

lemma *budget-constraint-is-feasible*:
assumes $i \in$ *agents*
assumes *X* $\in$ (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value P*) *consumption-set* (*P* $\cdot$ $\mathcal{E}$[*i*]))
shows *P* $\cdot$ *X* $\leq$ *P* $\cdot$ $\mathcal{E}$[*i*]
using *budget-constraint-def assms*
by (*simp add*: *budget-constraint-def*)

lemma *arg-max-set-therefore-no-better* :

assumes $i \in$ *agents*
assumes $x \in$ *arg-max-set* $U[i]$ (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value* P) *consumption-set* $(P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i])$)
shows $U[i]\ y > U[i]\ x \longrightarrow y \notin$ *budget-constraint* (*calculate-value* P) *consumption-set* $(P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i])$
by (*meson no-better-in-s assms*)

Since we need no restriction on the consumption set for the First Welfare Theorem

lemma *consumption-set-member*: $\forall\, x.\ x \in$ *consumption-set*
proof −
have $\bigwedge(x::'a).\ x \in$ *consumption-set*
using *cons-set-props pre-arrow-debreu-consumption-set-def*
by (*simp add*: *pre-arrow-debreu-consumption-set-def*)
thus *?thesis*
by *blast*
qed

Under the assumption of Local non-satiation, agents will utilise their entire budget.

lemma *argmax-entire-budget* :
assumes $i \in$ *agents*
assumes *local-nonsatiation consumption-set* $Pr[i]$
assumes $X \in$ *arg-max-set* $U[i]$ (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value* P) *consumption-set* $(P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i])$)
shows $P \cdot X = P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i]$
proof −
have *leq* : $(P \cdot X) \leq (P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i])$
proof−
have $X \in$ *budget-constraint* (*calculate-value* P) *consumption-set* $(P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i])$
using *argmax-sol-in-s*[*of* X $U[i]$ *budget-constraint* (*calculate-value* P) *consumption-set* $(P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i])$]
assms **by** *auto*
thus *?thesis*
using *assms*(*1*) *budget-constraint-is-feasible* **by** *blast*
qed
have *not-less*: $\neg(P \cdot X < P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i])$
proof
assume *cpos*: $(P \cdot X) < (P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i])$
define *lesS* **where** $lesS = \{x.\ P \cdot x < P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i]\}$
obtain e **where**
e: $0 < e$ *ball* $X\ e \subseteq lesS$
by (*metis cpos lesS-def mem-Collect-eq*
open-contains-ball-eq open-halfspace-lt)
obtain Y **where**
Y: $Y \succ[Pref\ i]\ X\ \ Y \in$ *ball* $X\ e$
using e *consumption-set-member assms* **by** *blast*
have $Y \in$ *consumption-set*
using *consumption-set-member* **by** *blast*

hence $Y \in$ *budget-constraint* (*calculate-value* P) *consumption-set* ($P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i]$)
using *budget-constraint-def e lesS-def*
less-eq-real-def Y **by** *fastforce*
thus *False*
by (*meson assms Y all-leq utility-function-def*)
qed
show *?thesis*
using *leq not-less* **by** *auto*
qed

All bundles that would be strictly preferred to any argmax result, are more expensive.

lemma *pref-more-expensive*:
assumes $i \in$ *agents*
assumes $x \in$ *arg-max-set* $U[i]$ (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value* P) *consumption-set* ($P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i]$))
assumes $U[i]\ y > U[i]\ x$
shows $y \cdot P > P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i]$
proof (*rule ccontr*)
assume *cpos* : $\neg(y \cdot P > P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i])$
then have *xp-leq* : $y \cdot P \leq P \cdot \ \mathcal{E}[i]$
by *auto*
hence $x \in$ *budget-constraint* (*calculate-value* P) *consumption-set* ($P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i]$)
using *argmax-sol-in-s*[*of* x $U[i]$ *budget-constraint* (*calculate-value* P) *consumption-set* ($P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i]$)]
assms **by** *auto*
hence *xp-in*: $y \in$ *budget-constraint* (*calculate-value* P) *consumption-set* ($P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i]$)
proof −
have $P \cdot y \leq P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i]$
by (*metis xp-leq inner-commute*)
then show *?thesis*
using *consumption-set-member* **by** (*simp add*: *budget-constraint-def*)
qed
hence $y \succ$[*Pref i*] x
using *arg-max-set-therefore-no-better assms* **by** *blast*
hence $y \succ$[*Pref i*] $x \wedge y \in$ *budget-constraint* (*calculate-value* P) *consumption-set* ($P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i]$)
using *xp-in* **by** *blast*
hence $x \notin$ *arg-max-set* $U[i]$ (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value* P) *consumption-set* ($P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i]$))
by (*meson assms exchange-economy.arg-max-set-therefore-no-better exchange-economy-axioms*)
then show *False*
using *assms*(*2*) **by** *auto*
qed

Greater or equal utility implies greater or equal price.

lemma *same-util-is-equal-or-more-expensive*:
assumes $i \in$ *agents*

assumes *local-nonsatiation consumption-set Pr*[*i*]
assumes $x \in$ *arg-max-set U*[*i*] (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value P*) *consumption-set* ($P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i]$))
assumes $U[i]\ y \geq U[i]\ x$
shows $y \cdot P \geq P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i]$
proof–
have *not-in*: $y \notin$ *arg-max-set U*[*i*] (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value P*) *consumption-set* ($P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i]$))
$\Longrightarrow y \cdot P > P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i]$
proof–
assume $y \notin$ *arg-max-set U*[*i*] (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value P*) *consumption-set* ($P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i]$))
then have $y \notin$ *budget-constraint* (*calculate-value P*) *consumption-set* ($P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i]$)
by (*meson assms leq-all-in-sol assms*)
then show *?thesis*
by (*simp add*: *budget-constraint-def inner-commute consumption-set-member*)
qed
show *?thesis*
by (*metis argmax-entire-budget not-in assms*(*1,2,3*) *dual-order.order-iff-strict inner-commute*)
qed

lemma *all-in-argmax-same-price*:
assumes $i \in$ *agents*
assumes *local-nonsatiation consumption-set Pr*[*i*]
assumes $x \in$ *arg-max-set U*[*i*] (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value P*) *consumption-set* ($P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i]$))
and $y \in$ *arg-max-set U*[*i*] (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value P*) *consumption-set* ($P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i]$))
shows $P \cdot x = P \cdot y$
using *argmax-entire-budget assms*(*1*) *assms*(*2*) *assms*(*3*) *assms*(*4*) **by** *presburger*

All rationally acting agents (which is every agent by assumption) will not decrease his utility

lemma *individual-rationalism* :
assumes *comp-equilib-endow P X* $\mathcal{E}$
shows $\forall\, i \in$ *agents*. *X i* $\succeq$[*Pref i*] $\mathcal{E}[i]$
by (*metis pref-more-expensive comp-equilib-endow-def assms inner-commute less-irrefl not-le utility-function-def*)

lemma *walras-law-per-agent* :
assumes $\bigwedge i.\ i \in$ *agents* $\Longrightarrow$ *local-nonsatiation consumption-set Pr*[*i*]
assumes *comp-equilib-endow P X* $\mathcal{E}$
shows $\forall\, i \in$ *agents*. $P \cdot X\ i = P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i]$
by (*meson argmax-entire-budget comp-equilib-endow-def assms*)

Walras Law holds in our Exchange Economy model. It states that in an equilibrium, demand equals supply

lemma *walras-law*:
assumes $\bigwedge i.\ i \in agents \Longrightarrow$ *local-nonsatiation consumption-set* $Pr[i]$
assumes *comp-equilib-endow* $P\ X\ \mathcal{E}$
shows $(\sum i{\in}agents.\ P \cdot (X\ i)) - (\sum i{\in}agents.\ P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i]) = 0$
using *assms walras-law-per-agent* **by** *auto*

lemma *inner-with-ge-0*: $(P{::}(real, 'n{::}finite)\ vec) > 0 \Longrightarrow A \geq B \Longrightarrow\ P \cdot A \geq P \cdot B$
by (*metis dual-order.order-iff-strict inner-commute interval-inner-leI*(2) *ord-class.atLeastAtMost-iff*)

7.5 First Welfare Theorem in Exchange Economy

We prove the first welfare theorem in our Exchange Economy model.

theorem *first-welfare-theorem-exchange*:
assumes *lns* : $\bigwedge i.\ i \in agents \Longrightarrow$ *local-nonsatiation consumption-set* $Pr[i]$
and *price-cond*: $Price > 0$
assumes *equilibrium* : *comp-equilib-endow Price* $\mathcal{X}\ \mathcal{E}$
shows *pareto-optimal-endow* $\mathcal{X}\ \mathcal{E}$
proof (*rule ccontr*)
assume *neg-ass* : $\neg$ *pareto-optimal-endow* $\mathcal{X}\ \mathcal{E}$
have *equili-feasible* : *feasible-allocation* $\mathcal{X}\ \mathcal{E}$
using *comp-equilib-endow-def equilibrium*
by (*simp add*: *comp-equilib-endow-def*)
have *price-g-zero* : $Price > 0$
by (*simp add*: *price-cond*)
obtain Y **where**
xprime-pareto: *feasible-allocation* $Y\ \mathcal{E} \wedge$
$(\forall i \in agents.\ U[i]\ (Y\ i) \geq U[i]\ (\mathcal{X}\ i)) \wedge$
$(\exists i \in agents.\ U[i]\ (Y\ i) > U[i]\ (\mathcal{X}\ i))$
using *equili-feasible neg-ass pareto-dominating-def pareto-optimal-endow-def* **by** *auto*
have *is-feasible* : *feasible-allocation* $Y\ \mathcal{E}$
using *xprime-pareto* **by** *blast*
have *all-great-eq-value* : $\forall i \in agents.\ Price \cdot (Y\ i) \geq Price \cdot (\mathcal{X}\ i)$
proof
fix i
assume $i \in agents$
show $Price \cdot (Y\ i) \geq Price \cdot (\mathcal{X}\ i)$
proof −
have *x-in-agmx* : $(\mathcal{X}\ i) \in$ *arg-max-set* $U[i]$ (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value Price*) *consumption-set* $(Price \cdot \mathcal{E}[i])$)
by (*meson* ‹$i \in agents$› *comp-equilib-endow-def equilibrium*)
have $(\ U[i])\ (\mathcal{X}\ i) - U[i]\ (Y\ i) \leq 0$
using ‹$i \in agents$› *xprime-pareto* **by** *auto*
hence $Price \cdot (\mathcal{X}\ i) - Price \cdot (Y\ i) \leq 0$
by (*metis* ‹$i \in agents$› *argmax-entire-budget diff-le-0-iff-le x-in-agmx inner-commute lns same-util-is-equal-or-more-expensive*)
then show *?thesis*

```
      by auto
    qed
  qed
  have ex-greater-value : ∃ i ∈ agents. Price · (Y i) > Price · (𝒳 i)
  proof (rule ccontr)
    assume a1 : ¬(∃ i ∈ agents. Price · (Y i) > Price · (𝒳 i))
    obtain i where
      obt-witness : i ∈ agents U[i] (Y i) > ( U[i]) (𝒳 i)
      using xprime-pareto by blast
    have Price · Y i ≠ Price · 𝒳 i
    proof −
      have Price · Y i > Price · ℰ i
        by (metis pref-more-expensive comp-equilib-endow-def
            equilibrium inner-commute obt-witness(1) obt-witness(2))
      have Price · ℰ i = Price · 𝒳 i
        using equilibrium lns obt-witness(1) walras-law-per-agent by auto
      then show ?thesis
        using ‹Price · ℰ i < Price · Y i› by linarith
    qed
    then show False
      using a1 all-great-eq-value obt-witness(1) by fastforce
  qed
  have dominating-more-exp : Price · (∑ i∈agents. Y i) > Price · (∑ i∈agents.
𝒳 i)
  proof −
    have mp-rule : (∑ i∈agents. Price · Y i) > (∑ i∈agents. Price · 𝒳 i) ⟹
?thesis
      by (simp add: inner-sum-right)
    have (∑ i∈agents. Price · Y i) > (∑ i∈agents. Price · 𝒳 i)
    by (simp add: all-great-eq-value finite-agents ex-greater-value sum-strict-mono-ex1)
    thus Price · (∑ i∈agents. Y i) > Price · (∑ i∈agents. 𝒳 i)
      using mp-rule by blast
  qed
  have equili-walras-law : Price · (∑ i∈agents. 𝒳 i) = Price · (∑ i∈agents. ℰ[i])
    by (metis (mono-tags) eq-iff-diff-eq-0 equilibrium
        inner-sum-right lns walras-law)
  have dominating-feasible : Price · (∑ i∈agents. 𝒳 i) ≥ Price · (∑ i∈agents. Y
i)
    by (metis atLeastAtMost-iff dual-order.order-iff-strict equili-walras-law
     feasible-allocation-def inner-commute interval-inner-leI(1) is-feasible price-g-zero)
  show False
    using dominating-more-exp equili-walras-law dominating-feasible
    by linarith
qed
```

Monotone preferences can be used instead of local non-satiation. Many textbooks etc. do not introduce the concept of local non-satiation and use monotonicity instead.

corollary *first-welfare-exch-thm-monot*:

assumes $\forall M \in carrier.\ (\forall x > M.\ x \in carrier)$
assumes $\bigwedge i.\ i \in agents \Longrightarrow monotone\text{-}preference\ consumption\text{-}set\ Pr[i]$
and *price-cond*: $Price > 0$
assumes *comp-equilib-endow Price* $\mathcal{X}$ $\mathcal{E}$
shows *pareto-optimal-endow* $\mathcal{X}$ $\mathcal{E}$
by (*meson assms exchange-economy.consumption-set-member*
first-welfare-theorem-exchange exchange-economy-axioms unbounded-above-mono-imp-lns)

end

end

end

8 Pre Arrow-Debreu model

Model similar to Arrow-Debreu model but with fewer assumptions, since we only need assumptions strong enough to proof the First Welfare Theorem.

theory *Private-Ownership-Economy*
imports
../Preferences
../Preferences
../Utility-Functions
../Argmax
Consumers
Common
begin

locale *pre-arrow-debreu-model* =
fixes *production-sets* :: $'f \Rightarrow ('a$::*ordered-euclidean-space*$)$ *set*
fixes *consumption-set* :: $'a$ *set*
fixes *agents* :: $'i$ *set*
fixes *firms* :: $'f$ *set*
fixes $\mathcal{E}$ :: $'i \Rightarrow 'a$ $(\mathcal{E}[\text{-}])$
fixes *Pref* :: $'i \Rightarrow 'a$ *relation* $(Pr[\text{-}])$
fixes U :: $'i \Rightarrow 'a \Rightarrow$ *real* $(U[\text{-}])$
fixes Θ :: $'i \Rightarrow 'f \Rightarrow$ *real* $(\Theta[\text{-},\text{-}])$
assumes *cons-set-props*: *pre-arrow-debreu-consumption-set consumption-set*
assumes *agent-props*: $i \in agents \Longrightarrow$ *eucl-ordinal-utility consumption-set* $(Pr[i])$ $(U[i])$
assumes *firms-comp-owned*: $j \in firms \Longrightarrow (\sum i \in agents.\ \Theta[i,j]) = 1$
assumes *finite-nonepty-agents*: *finite agents* **and** $agents \neq \{\}$

sublocale *pre-arrow-debreu-model* $\subseteq$ *pareto-ordering agents U*
.

context *pre-arrow-debreu-model*

begin

No restrictions on consumption set needed

lemma *all-larger-zero-in-csset*: $\forall\, x.\ x \in$ *consumption-set*
using *cons-set-props pre-arrow-debreu-consumption-set-def* **by** *blast*

context
begin

Calculate wealth of individual i in context of Private Ownership economy.

private abbreviation *poe-wealth*
where
poe-wealth P i Y $\equiv P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i] + (\sum j \in$ *firms*. $\Theta[i,j] *_R (P \cdot Y\ j))$

8.1 Feasiblity

private abbreviation *feasible*
where
feasible X Y $\equiv$ *feasible-private-ownership agents firms* $\mathcal{E}$ *consumption-set production-sets X Y*

private abbreviation *calculate-value*
where
calculate-value P x $\equiv P \cdot x$

8.2 Profit maximisation

In a production economy we need to specify profit maximisation.

definition *profit-maximisation*
where
profit-maximisation P S $=$ *arg-max-set* $(\lambda x.\ P \cdot x)\ S$

8.3 Competitive Equilibirium

Competitive equilibrium in context of production economy with private ownership. This includes the profit maximisation condition.

definition *competitive-equilibrium*
where
competitive-equilibrium P X Y $\longleftrightarrow$ *feasible X Y* $\wedge$
$(\forall\, j \in$ *firms*. $(Y\ j) \in$ *profit-maximisation P* (*production-sets j*)) $\wedge$
$(\forall\, i \in$ *agents*. $(X\ i) \in$ *arg-max-set U*[*i*] (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value P*) *consumption-set* (*poe-wealth P i Y*)))

lemma *competitive-equilibriumD* [*dest*]:
assumes *competitive-equilibrium P X Y*
shows *feasible X Y* $\wedge$
$(\forall\, j \in$ *firms*. $(Y\ j) \in$ *profit-maximisation P* (*production-sets j*)) $\wedge$

$(\forall\, i \in \mathit{agents}.\ (X\ i) \in \mathit{arg\text{-}max\text{-}set}\ U[i]\ (\mathit{budget\text{-}constraint}\ (\mathit{calculate\text{-}value}\ P)\ \mathit{consumption\text{-}set}\ (\mathit{poe\text{-}wealth}\ P\ i\ Y)))$
using *assms* **by** (*simp add*: *competitive-equilibrium-def*)

lemma *compet-max-profit*:
assumes $j \in \mathit{firms}$
assumes *competitive-equilibrium P X Y*
shows $Y\ j \in \mathit{profit\text{-}maximisation}\ P\ (\mathit{production\text{-}sets}\ j)$
using *assms*(*1*) *assms*(*2*) **by** *blast*

8.4 Pareto Optimality

definition *pareto-optimal*
where
pareto-optimal X Y $\longleftrightarrow$
$(\mathit{feasible}\ X\ Y \wedge$
$(\nexists\, X'\ Y'.\ \mathit{feasible}\ X'\ Y' \wedge X' \succ \mathit{Pareto}\ X))$

lemma *pareto-optimalI*[*intro*]:
assumes *feasible X Y*
and $\nexists\, X'\ Y'.\ \mathit{feasible}\ X'\ Y' \wedge X' \succ \mathit{Pareto}\ X$
shows *pareto-optimal X Y*
using *pareto-optimal-def assms*(*1*) *assms*(*2*) **by** *blast*

lemma *pareto-optimalD*[*dest*]:
assumes *pareto-optimal X Y*
shows *feasible X Y* **and** $\nexists\, X'\ Y'.\ \mathit{feasible}\ X'\ Y' \wedge X' \succ \mathit{Pareto}\ X$
using *pareto-optimal-def assms* **by** *auto*

lemma *util-fun-def-holds*: $i \in \mathit{agents} \Longrightarrow x \succeq[Pr[i]]\ y \longleftrightarrow U[i]\ x \geq U[i]\ y$
by (*meson agent-props all-larger-zero-in-csset eucl-ordinal-utility-def ordinal-utility-def*)

lemma *base-pref-is-ord-eucl-rpr*: $i \in \mathit{agents} \Longrightarrow \mathit{rational\text{-}preference}\ \mathit{consumption\text{-}set}\ Pr[i]$
using *agent-props ord-eucl-utility-imp-rpr real-vector-rpr.have-rpr* **by** *blast*

lemma *prof-max-ge-all-in-pset*:
assumes $j \in \mathit{firms}$
assumes $Y\ j \in \mathit{profit\text{-}maximisation}\ P\ (\mathit{production\text{-}sets}\ j)$
shows $\forall\, y \in \mathit{production\text{-}sets}\ j.\ P \cdot Y\ j \geq P \cdot y$
using *all-leq assms*(*2*) *profit-maximisation-def* **by** *fastforce*

8.5 Lemmas for final result

Strictly preferred bundles are strictly more expensive.

lemma *all-prefered-are-more-expensive*:
assumes *i-agt*: $i \in \mathit{agents}$
assumes *equil*: *competitive-equilibrium P* $\mathcal{X}$ $\mathcal{Y}$
assumes $z \in \mathit{consumption\text{-}set}$

assumes $(U\ i)\ z > (U\ i)\ (\mathcal{X}\ i)$
shows $z \cdot P > P \cdot (\mathcal{X}\ i)$
proof (*rule ccontr*)
assume *neg-as* : $\neg(z \cdot P > P \cdot (\mathcal{X}\ i))$
have *xp-leq* : $z \cdot P \leq P \cdot\ (\mathcal{X}\ i)$
using ‹$\neg z \cdot P > P \cdot (\mathcal{X}\ i)$› **by** *auto*
have *x-in-argmax*: $(\mathcal{X}\ i) \in$ *arg-max-set* $U[i]$ (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value P*) *consumption-set* (*poe-wealth P i* $\mathcal{Y}$))
using *equil i-agt* **by** *blast*
hence *x-in*: $\mathcal{X}\ i \in$ (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value P*) *consumption-set* (*poe-wealth P i* $\mathcal{Y}$))
using *argmax-sol-in-s* [*of* $(\mathcal{X}\ i)$ $U[i]$ *budget-constraint* (*calculate-value P*) *consumption-set* (*poe-wealth P i* $\mathcal{Y}$)]
by *blast*
hence *z-in-budget*: $z \in$ (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value P*) *consumption-set* (*poe-wealth P i* $\mathcal{Y}$))
proof −
have *z-leq-endow*: $P \cdot z \leq P \cdot (\mathcal{X}\ i)$
by (*metis xp-leq inner-commute*)
have *z-in-cons*: $z \in$ *consumption-set*
using *assms* **by** *auto*
then show *?thesis*
using *x-in budget-constraint-def z-leq-endow*
proof −
have $\forall r.\ \ P \cdot \mathcal{X}\ i \leq r \longrightarrow P \cdot z \leq r$
using *z-leq-endow* **by** *linarith*
then show *?thesis*
using *budget-constraint-def x-in z-in-cons*
by (*simp add*: *budget-constraint-def*)
qed
qed
have *nex-prop*: $\nexists e.\ e \in$ (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value P*) *consumption-set* (*poe-wealth P i* $\mathcal{Y}$)) $\wedge$
$U[i]\ e > U[i]\ (\mathcal{X}\ i)$
using *no-better-in-s*[*of* $\mathcal{X}$ *i* $U[i]$
budget-constraint (*calculate-value P*) *consumption-set* (*poe-wealth P i* $\mathcal{Y}$)] *x-in-argmax* **by** *blast*
have $z \in$ *budget-constraint* (*calculate-value P*) *consumption-set* (*poe-wealth P i* $\mathcal{Y}$) $\wedge$ $U[i]\ z > U[i]\ (\mathcal{X}\ i)$
using *assms z-in-budget* **by** *blast*
thus *False* **using** *nex-prop*
by *blast*
qed

Given local non-satiation, argmax will use the entire budget.

lemma *am-utilises-entire-bgt*:
assumes *i-agts*: $i \in$ *agents*
assumes *lns* : *local-nonsatiation consumption-set* $Pr[i]$
assumes *argmax-sol* : $X \in$ *arg-max-set* $U[i]$ (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value*

```
P) consumption-set (poe-wealth P i Y))
  shows P · X = P · ℰ[i] + (∑ j∈firms. Θ[i,j] *R (P · Y j))
proof −
  let ?wlt = P · ℰ[i] + (∑ j∈firms. Θ[i,j] *R (P · Y j))
  let ?bc = budget-constraint (calculate-value P) consumption-set (poe-wealth P i
Y)
  have X ∈ budget-constraint (calculate-value P) consumption-set (poe-wealth P i
Y)
    using argmax-sol-in-s [of X U[i] ?bc] argmax-sol by blast
  hence is-leq: X · P ≤ (poe-wealth P i Y)
    by (metis (mono-tags, lifting) budget-constraint-def
        inner-commute mem-Collect-eq)
  have not-less: ¬X · P < (poe-wealth P i Y)
  proof
    assume neg: X · P < (poe-wealth P i Y)
    have bgt-leq: ∀ x∈ ?bc. U[i] X ≥ U[i] x
      using leq-all-in-sol [of X U[i] ?bc]
        all-leq [of X U[i] ?bc]
        argmax-sol by blast
    define s-low where
      s-low = {x . P · x < ?wlt}
    have ∃ e > 0. ball X e ⊆ s-low
    proof −
      have x-in-budget: P · X < ?wlt
        by (metis inner-commute neg)
      have s-low-open: open s-low
        using open-halfspace-lt s-low-def by blast
      then show ?thesis
        using s-low-open open-contains-ball-eq
          s-low-def x-in-budget by blast
    qed
    obtain e where
      e > 0 and e: ball X e ⊆ s-low
      using ‹∃ e>0. ball X e ⊆ s-low› by blast
    obtain y where
      y-props: y ∈ ball X e y ≻[Pref i] X
      using ‹0 < e› all-larger-zero-in-csset lns by blast
    have y ∈ budget-constraint (calculate-value P) consumption-set (poe-wealth P
i Y)
    proof −
      have y ∈ s-low
        using ‹y ∈ ball X e› e by blast
      then show ?thesis
        by (simp add: s-low-def all-larger-zero-in-csset
            budget-constraint-def)
    qed
    then show False
      using bgt-leq i-agts y-props(2) util-fun-def-holds by blast
  qed
```

then show *?thesis*
by (*metis inner-commute is-leq*
less-eq-real-def)
qed

corollary *x-equil-x-ext-budget*:
assumes *i-agt*: $i \in$ *agents*
assumes *lns* : *local-nonsatiation consumption-set* $Pr[i]$
assumes *equilibrium* : *competitive-equilibrium* P X Y
shows $P \cdot X\ i = P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i] + (\sum j \in$*firms*$.\ \Theta[i,j] *_R (P \cdot Y\ j))$
proof −
have $X\ i \in$ *arg-max-set* $U[i]$ (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value* P) *consumption-set* (*poe-wealth* P i Y))
using *equilibrium i-agt* **by** *blast*
then show *?thesis*
using *am-utilises-entire-bgt i-agt lns* **by** *blast*
qed

lemma *same-price-in-argmax* :
assumes *i-agt*: $i \in$ *agents*
assumes *lns* : *local-nonsatiation consumption-set* $Pr[i]$
assumes $x \in$ *arg-max-set* ($U[i]$) (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value* P) *consumption-set* (*poe-wealth* P i Y))
assumes $y \in$ *arg-max-set* ($U[i]$) (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value* P) *consumption-set* (*poe-wealth* P i Y))
shows $(P \cdot x) = (P \cdot y)$
using *am-utilises-entire-bgt assms lns*
by (*metis* (*no-types*) *am-utilises-entire-bgt assms*(*3*) *assms*(*4*) *i-agt lns*)

Greater or equal utility implies greater or equal value.

lemma *utility-ge-price-ge* :
assumes *agts*: $i \in$ *agents*
assumes *lns* : *local-nonsatiation consumption-set* $Pr[i]$
assumes *equil*: *competitive-equilibrium* P X Y
assumes *geq*: $U[i]\ z \geq U[i]\ (X\ i)$
and $z \in$ *consumption-set*
shows $P \cdot z \geq P \cdot (X\ i)$
proof −
let *?bc* = (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value* P) *consumption-set* (*poe-wealth* P i Y))
have *not-in* : $z \notin$ *arg-max-set* ($U[i]$) *?bc* $\Longrightarrow$
$P \cdot z > (P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i]) + (\sum j \in$(*firms*)$.\ (\Theta[i,j] *_R (P \cdot Y\ j)))$
proof−
assume $z \notin$ *arg-max-set* ($U[i]$) *?bc*
moreover have $X\ i \in$ *arg-max-set* ($U[i]$) *?bc*
using *competitive-equilibriumD assms pareto-optimal-def*
by *auto*
ultimately have $z \notin$ *budget-constraint* (*calculate-value* P) *consumption-set* (*poe-wealth* P i Y)

by (*meson geq leq-all-in-sol*)
then show *?thesis*
using *budget-constraint-def assms*
by (*simp add*: *budget-constraint-def*)
qed
have *x-in-argmax*: $(X\ i) \in$ *arg-max-set* $U[i]$ *?bc*
using *agts equil* **by** *blast*
hence *x-in-budget*: $(X\ i) \in$ *?bc*
using *argmax-sol-in-s* [*of* $(X\ i)$ $U[i]$ *?bc*] **by** *blast*
have $U[i]\ z = U[i]\ (X\ i) \Longrightarrow P \cdot z \geq P \cdot (X\ i)$
proof(*rule contrapos-pp*)
assume *con-neg*: $\neg\ P \cdot z \geq P \cdot (X\ i)$
then have $P \cdot z < P \cdot (X\ i)$
by *linarith*
then have *z-in-argmax*: $z \in$ *arg-max-set* $U[i]$ *?bc*
proof −
have $P \cdot (X\ i) = P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i] + (\sum j \in$*firms*. $\Theta[i,j] *_R (P \cdot Y\ j))$
using *agts am-utilises-entire-bgt lns x-in-argmax* **by** *blast*
then show *?thesis*
by (*metis* (*no-types*) *con-neg less-eq-real-def not-in*)
qed
have *z-budget-utilisation*: $P \cdot z = P \cdot (X\ i)$
by (*metis* (*no-types*) *agts am-utilises-entire-bgt lns x-in-argmax z-in-argmax*)
have $P \cdot (X\ i) = P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i] + (\sum j \in$*firms*. $\Theta[i,j] *_R (P \cdot Y\ j))$
using *agts am-utilises-entire-bgt lns x-in-argmax* **by** *blast*
show $\neg\ U[i]\ z = U[i]\ (X\ i)$
using *z-budget-utilisation con-neg* **by** *linarith*
qed
thus *?thesis*
by (*metis* (*no-types*) *agts am-utilises-entire-bgt eq-iff eucl-less-le-not-le lns not-in x-in-argmax*)
qed

lemma *commutativity-sums-over-funs*:
fixes $X :: 'x\ set$
fixes $Y :: 'y\ set$
shows $(\sum i \in X.\ \sum j \in Y.\ (f\ i\ j *_R C \cdot g\ j)) = (\sum j \in Y. \sum i \in X.\ (f\ i\ j *_R C \cdot g\ j))$
using *Groups-Big.comm-monoid-add-class.sum.swap* **by** *auto*

lemma *assoc-fun-over-sum*:
fixes $X :: 'x\ set$
fixes $Y :: 'y\ set$
shows $(\sum j \in Y.\ \sum i \in X.\ f\ i\ j *_R C \cdot g\ j) = (\sum j \in Y.\ (\sum i \in X.\ f\ i\ j) *_R C \cdot g\ j)$
by (*simp add*: *inner-sum-left scaleR-left.sum*)

Walras' law in context of production economy with private ownership. That is, in an equilibrium demand equals supply.

lemma *walras-law*:
assumes $\bigwedge i.\ i \in$*agents* $\Longrightarrow$ *local-nonsatiation consumption-set* $Pr[i]$

assumes ($\forall i \in agents.\ (X\ i) \in arg\text{-}max\text{-}set\ U[i]\ (budget\text{-}constraint\ (calculate\text{-}value\ P)\ consumption\text{-}set\ (poe\text{-}wealth\ P\ i\ Y))$)
shows $P \cdot (\sum i{\in}agents.\ (X\ i)) = P \cdot ((\sum i{\in}agents.\ \mathcal{E}[i]) + (\sum j{\in}firms.\ Y\ j))$
proof −
have *value-equal*: $P \cdot (\sum i{\in}agents.\ (X\ i)) = P \cdot (\sum i{\in}agents.\ \mathcal{E}[i]) + (\sum i{\in}agents.\ \sum f{\in}firms.\ \Theta[i,f]\ *_R\ (P \cdot Y\ f))$
proof −
have *all-exhaust-bgt*: $\forall i{\in}agents.\ P \cdot (X\ i) = P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i] + (\sum j{\in}firms.\ \Theta[i,j]\ *_R\ (P \cdot (Y\ j)))$
using *assms am-utilises-entire-bgt* **by** *blast*
then show *?thesis*
by (*simp add*:*all-exhaust-bgt inner-sum-right sum.distrib*)
qed
have *eq-1*: $(\sum i{\in}agents.\ \sum j{\in}firms.\ (\Theta[i,j]\ *_R\ P \cdot Y\ j)) = (\sum j{\in}firms.\ \sum i{\in}agents.\ (\Theta[i,j]\ *_R\ P \cdot Y\ j))$
using *commutativity-sums-over-funs* [*of* Θ P Y *firms agents*] **by** *blast*
hence *eq-2*: $P \cdot (\sum i{\in}agents.\ X\ i) = P \cdot (\sum i{\in}agents.\ \mathcal{E}[i]) + (\sum j{\in}firms.\ \sum i{\in}agents.\ \Theta[i,j]\ *_R\ P \cdot Y\ j)$
using *value-equal* **by** *auto*
also have *eq-3*: $...= P \cdot (\sum i{\in}agents.\ \mathcal{E}[i]) + (\sum j{\in}firms.\ (\sum i{\in}agents.\ \Theta[i,j])\ *_R\ P \cdot\ Y\ j)$
using *assoc-fun-over-sum*[*of* Θ P Y *agents firms*] **by** *auto*
also have *eq-4*: $... = P \cdot (\sum i{\in}agents.\ \mathcal{E}[i]) + (\sum f{\in}firms.\ P \cdot\ Y\ f)$
using *firms-comp-owned* **by** *auto*
have *comp-wise-inner*: $P \cdot\ (\sum i{\in}agents.\ X\ i) - (P \cdot (\sum i{\in}agents.\ \mathcal{E}[i])) - (\sum f{\in}firms.\ P \cdot Y\ f) = 0$
using *eq-1 eq-2 eq-3 eq-4* **by** *linarith*
then show *?thesis*
by (*simp add*: *inner-right-distrib inner-sum-right*)
qed

lemma *walras-law-in-compeq*:
assumes $\bigwedge i.\ i{\in}agents \Longrightarrow local\text{-}nonsatiation\ consumption\text{-}set\ Pr[i]$
assumes *competitive-equilibrium P X Y*
shows $P \cdot ((\sum i{\in}agents.\ (X\ i)) - (\sum i{\in}agents.\ \mathcal{E}[i]) - (\sum j{\in}firms.\ Y\ j)) = 0$
proof−
have $P \cdot (\sum i{\in}agents.\ (X\ i)) = P \cdot ((\sum i{\in}agents.\ \mathcal{E}[i]) + (\sum j{\in}firms.\ Y\ j))$
using *assms*(*1*) *assms*(*2*) *walras-law* **by** *auto*
then show *?thesis*
by (*simp add*: *inner-diff-right inner-right-distrib*)
qed

8.6 First Welfare Theorem

Proof of First Welfare Theorem in context of production economy with private ownership.

theorem *first-welfare-theorem-priv-own*:
assumes $\bigwedge i.\ i \in agents \Longrightarrow local\text{-}nonsatiation\ consumption\text{-}set\ Pr[i]$
and $Price > 0$

assumes *competitive-equilibrium Price* $\mathcal{X}$ $\mathcal{Y}$
shows *pareto-optimal* $\mathcal{X}$ $\mathcal{Y}$
proof (*rule ccontr*)
assume *neg-as*: ¬ *pareto-optimal* $\mathcal{X}$ $\mathcal{Y}$
have *equili-feasible* : *feasible* $\mathcal{X}$ $\mathcal{Y}$
using *assms* **by** (*simp add*: *competitive-equilibrium-def*)
obtain X' Y' **where**
xprime-pareto: *feasible* X' Y' ∧
(∀ $i \in$ *agents*. $U[i]$ $(X'\ i) \geq U[i]$ $(\mathcal{X}\ i)$) ∧
(∃ $i \in$ *agents*. $U[i]$ $(X'\ i) > U[i]$ $(\mathcal{X}\ i)$)
using *equili-feasible pareto-optimal-def*
pareto-dominating-def neg-as **by** *auto*
have *is-feasible*: *feasible* X' Y'
using *xprime-pareto* **by** *blast*
have *xprime-leq-y*: ∀ $i \in$ *agents*. (*Price* · $(X'\ i) \geq$
(*Price* · $\mathcal{E}[i]$) + ($\sum j \in$(*firms*). $\Theta[i,j]$ $*_R$ (*Price* · $\mathcal{Y}$ j)))
proof
fix i
assume *as*: $i \in$ *agents*
have *xprime-cons*: X' $i \in$ *consumption-set*
by (*simp add*: *all-larger-zero-in-csset*)
have *x-leq-xprime*: $U[i]$ $(X'\ i) \geq U[i]$ $(\mathcal{X}\ i)$
using ‹$i \in$ *agents*› *xprime-pareto* **by** *blast*
have *lns-pref*: *local-nonsatiation consumption-set Pr*[i]
using *as assms* **by** *blast*
hence *xprime-ge-x*: *Price* · $(X'\ i) \geq$ *Price* · $(\mathcal{X}\ i)$
using *x-leq-xprime xprime-cons as assms utility-ge-price-ge* **by** *blast*
then show *Price* · $(X'\ i) \geq$ (*Price* · $\mathcal{E}[i]$) + ($\sum j \in$(*firms*). $\Theta[i,j]$ $*_R$ (*Price* · $\mathcal{Y}$ j))
using *xprime-ge-x* ‹$i \in$ *agents*› *lns-pref assms x-equil-x-ext-budget* **by** *fastforce*
qed
have *ex-greater-value* : ∃ $i \in$ *agents*. *Price* · $(X'\ i) >$ *Price* · $(\mathcal{X}\ i)$
proof(*rule ccontr*)
assume *cpos* : ¬(∃ $i \in$ *agents*. *Price* · $(X'\ i) >$ *Price* · $(\mathcal{X}\ i)$)
obtain i **where**
obt-witness : $i \in$ *agents* $(U[i])$ $(X'\ i) > U[i]$ $(\mathcal{X}\ i)$
using *xprime-pareto* **by** *blast*
show *False*
by (*metis cpos all-larger-zero-in-csset all-prefered-are-more-expensive*
inner-commute obt-witness(*1*) *obt-witness*(*2*) *assms*(*3*))
qed
have *dom-g* : *Price* · ($\sum i \in$*agents*. $X'\ i$) > *Price* · ($\sum i \in$*agents*. $(\mathcal{X}\ i)$) (**is** - > - · *?x-sum*)
proof–
have ($\sum i \in$*agents*. *Price* · $X'\ i$) > ($\sum i \in$*agents*. *Price* · $(\mathcal{X}\ i)$)
by (*metis* (*mono-tags*, *lifting*) *xprime-leq-y assms*(*1,3*) *ex-greater-value*
finite-nonepty-agents sum-strict-mono-ex1 x-equil-x-ext-budget)
thus *Price* · ($\sum i \in$*agents*. $X'\ i$) > *Price* · *?x-sum*
by (*simp add*: *inner-sum-right*)

qed
let *?y-sum* = $(\sum j \in \mathit{firms}.\ \mathcal{Y}\ j)$
have *equili-walras-law*: $\mathit{Price} \cdot \mathit{?x\text{-}sum} =$
$(\sum i \in \mathit{agents}.\ \mathit{Price} \cdot \mathcal{E}[i] + (\sum j \in \mathit{firms}.\ \Theta[i,j] *_R (\mathit{Price} \cdot \mathcal{Y}\ j)))$ (**is** - = *?ws*)
proof–
have $\forall\, i \in \mathit{agents}.\ \mathit{Price} \cdot \mathcal{X}\ i = \mathit{Price} \cdot \mathcal{E}[i] + (\sum j \in \mathit{firms}.\ \Theta[i,j] *_R (\mathit{Price} \cdot \mathcal{Y}\ j))$
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *lifting*) *assms*(*1*,*3*) *x-equil-x-ext-budget*)
then show *?thesis*
by (*simp add*: *inner-sum-right*)
qed
also have *remove-firm-pct*: ... = $\mathit{Price} \cdot (\sum i \in \mathit{agents}.\ \mathcal{E}[i]) + (\mathit{Price} \cdot \mathit{?y\text{-}sum})$
proof–
have *equals-inner-price*:*0* = $\mathit{Price} \cdot (\mathit{?x\text{-}sum} - ((\sum i \in \mathit{agents}.\ \mathcal{E}\ i) + \mathit{?y\text{-}sum}))$
by (*metis* (*no-types*) *diff-diff-add assms*(*1*,*3*) *walras-law-in-compeq*)
have $\mathit{Price} \cdot \mathit{?x\text{-}sum} = \mathit{Price} \cdot ((\sum i \in \mathit{agents}.\ \mathcal{E}\ i) + \mathit{?y\text{-}sum})$
by (*metis* (*no-types*) *equals-inner-price inner-diff-right right-minus-eq*)
then show *?thesis*
by (*simp add*: *equili-walras-law inner-right-distrib*)
qed
have *xp-l-yp*: $(\sum i \in \mathit{agents}.\ X'\ i) \leq (\sum i \in \mathit{agents}.\ \mathcal{E}[i]) + (\sum f \in \mathit{firms}.\ Y'\ f)$
using *is-feasible feasible-private-ownership-def* **by** *blast*
hence *yprime-sgr-y*: $\mathit{Price} \cdot (\sum i \in \mathit{agents}.\ \mathcal{E}[i]) + \mathit{Price} \cdot (\sum f \in \mathit{firms}.\ Y'\ f) > \mathit{?ws}$
proof −
have $\mathit{Price} \cdot (\sum i \in \mathit{agents}.\ X'\ i) \leq \mathit{Price} \cdot ((\sum i \in \mathit{agents}.\ \mathcal{E}[i]) + (\sum j \in \mathit{firms}.\ Y'\ j))$
by (*metis xp-l-yp atLeastAtMost-iff inner-commute*
interval-inner-leI(*2*) *less-imp-le order-refl assms*(*2*))
hence $\mathit{?ws} < \mathit{Price} \cdot ((\sum i \in \mathit{agents}.\ \mathcal{E}\ i) + (\sum j \in \mathit{firms}.\ Y'\ j))$
using *dom-g equili-walras-law* **by** *linarith*
then show *?thesis*
by (*simp add*: *inner-right-distrib*)
qed
have *Y-is-optimum*: $\forall\, j \in \mathit{firms}.\ \forall\, y \in \mathit{production\text{-}sets}\ j.\ \mathit{Price} \cdot \mathcal{Y}\ j \geq \mathit{Price} \cdot y$
using *assms prof-max-ge-all-in-pset* **by** *blast*
have *yprime-in-prod-set*: $\forall\, j \in \mathit{firms}.\ Y'\ j \in \mathit{production\text{-}sets}\ j$
using *xprime-pareto* **by** (*simp add*: *feasible-private-ownership-def*)
hence $\forall\, j \in \mathit{firms}.\ \forall\, y \in \mathit{production\text{-}sets}\ j.\ \mathit{Price} \cdot \mathcal{Y}\ j \geq \mathit{Price} \cdot y$
using *Y-is-optimum* **by** *blast*
hence *Y-ge-yprime*: $\forall\, j \in \mathit{firms}.\ \mathit{Price} \cdot \mathcal{Y}\ j \geq \mathit{Price} \cdot Y'\ j$
using *yprime-in-prod-set* **by** *blast*
hence *yprime-p-leq-Y*: $\mathit{Price} \cdot (\sum f \in \mathit{firms}.\ Y'\ f) \leq \mathit{Price} \cdot \mathit{?y\text{-}sum}$
by (*simp add*: *Y-ge-yprime inner-sum-right sum-mono*)
then show *False*
using *remove-firm-pct yprime-sgr-y* **by** *linarith*
qed

Equilibrium cannot be Pareto dominated.

lemma *equilibria-dom-eachother*:
assumes $\bigwedge i.\ i \in agents \Longrightarrow$ *local-nonsatiation consumption-set* $Pr[i]$
and $Price > 0$
assumes *equil*: *competitive-equilibrium Price* $\mathcal{X}$ $\mathcal{Y}$
shows $\nexists X'\ Y'.$ *competitive-equilibrium* $P\ X'\ Y' \wedge X' \succ$*Pareto* $\mathcal{X}$
proof −
have *pareto-optimal* $\mathcal{X}$ $\mathcal{Y}$
by (*meson assms equil first-welfare-theorem-priv-own*)
hence $\nexists X'\ Y'.$ *feasible* $X'\ Y' \wedge X' \succ$*Pareto* $\mathcal{X}$
using *pareto-optimal-def* **by** *blast*
thus *?thesis*
by *auto*
qed

Using monotonicity instead of local non-satiation proves the First Welfare Theorem.

corollary *first-welfare-thm-monotone*:
assumes $\forall M \in carrier.\ (\forall x > M.\ x \in carrier)$
assumes $\bigwedge i.\ i \in agents \Longrightarrow$ *monotone-preference consumption-set* $Pr[i]$
and $Price > 0$
assumes *competitive-equilibrium Price* $\mathcal{X}$ $\mathcal{Y}$
shows *pareto-optimal* $\mathcal{X}$ $\mathcal{Y}$
using *all-larger-zero-in-csset assms*(*2*) *assms*(*3*) *assms*(*4*)
first-welfare-theorem-priv-own unbounded-above-mono-imp-lns **by** *blast*

end

end

end

9 Arrow-Debreu model

theory *Arrow-Debreu-Model*
imports
../Preferences
../Preferences
../Utility-Functions
../Argmax
Consumers
Common
begin

locale *pre-arrow-debreu-model* =
fixes *production-sets* :: $'f \Rightarrow$ ($'a$::*ordered-euclidean-space*) *set*
fixes *consumption-set* :: $'a$ *set*
fixes *agents* :: $'i$ *set*
fixes *firms* :: $'f$ *set*
fixes $\mathcal{E}$ :: $'i \Rightarrow 'a$ ($\mathcal{E}$[-])

fixes *Pref* :: *'i* ⇒ *'a relation* (*Pr*[-])
fixes *U* :: *'i* ⇒ *'a* ⇒ *real* (*U*[-])
fixes Θ :: *'i* ⇒ *'f* ⇒ *real* (Θ[-,-])
assumes *cons-set-props*: *arrow-debreu-consum-set consumption-set*
assumes *agent-props*: *i* ∈ *agents* ⟹ *eucl-ordinal-utility consumption-set* (*Pr*[*i*]) (*U*[*i*])
assumes *firms-comp-owned*: *j* ∈ *firms* ⟹ (∑ *i*∈*agents*. Θ[*i*,*j*]) = *1*
assumes *finite-nonepty-agents*: *finite agents* **and** *agents* ≠ {}

sublocale *pre-arrow-debreu-model* ⊆ *pareto-ordering agents U*
.

context *pre-arrow-debreu-model*
begin

Calculate wealth of individual i in context of Private Ownership economy.

context
begin

private abbreviation *poe-wealth*
where
poe-wealth P i Y ≡ *P* · *E*[*i*] + (∑ *j*∈*firms*. Θ[*i*,*j*] ∗$_R$ (*P* · *Y j*))

9.1 Feasiblity

private abbreviation *feasible*
where
feasible X Y ≡ *feasible-private-ownership agents firms* $\mathcal{E}$ *consumption-set production-sets X Y*

private abbreviation *calculate-value*
where
calculate-value P x ≡ *P* · *x*

9.2 Profit maximisation

In a production economy (which this is) we need to specify profit maximisation.

definition *profit-maximisation*
where
profit-maximisation P S = *arg-max-set* (λ*x*. *P* · *x*) *S*

9.3 Competitive Equilibirium

Competitive equilibrium in context of production economy with private ownership. This includes the profit maximisation condition.

definition *competitive-equilibrium*
where
competitive-equilibrium P X Y $\longleftrightarrow$ *feasible X Y* $\wedge$
$(\forall\, j \in$ *firms*. $(Y\ j) \in$ *profit-maximisation P* (*production-sets j*)) $\wedge$
$(\forall\, i \in$ *agents*. $(X\ i) \in$ *arg-max-set* $U[i]$ (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value P*) *consumption-set* (*poe-wealth P i Y*)))

lemma *competitive-equilibriumD* [*dest*]:
assumes *competitive-equilibrium P X Y*
shows *feasible X Y* $\wedge$
$(\forall\, j \in$ *firms*. $(Y\ j) \in$ *profit-maximisation P* (*production-sets j*)) $\wedge$
$(\forall\, i \in$ *agents*. $(X\ i) \in$ *arg-max-set* $U[i]$ (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value P*) *consumption-set* (*poe-wealth P i Y*)))
using *assms* **by** (*simp add*: *competitive-equilibrium-def*)

lemma *compet-max-profit*:
assumes $j \in$ *firms*
assumes *competitive-equilibrium P X Y*
shows $Y\ j \in$ *profit-maximisation P* (*production-sets j*)
using *assms*(*1*) *assms*(*2*) **by** *blast*

9.4 Pareto Optimality

definition *pareto-optimal*
where
pareto-optimal X Y $\longleftrightarrow$
(*feasible X Y* $\wedge$
$(\nexists\, X'\ Y'.$ *feasible* $X'\ Y' \wedge X' \succ$*Pareto X*))

lemma *pareto-optimalI*[*intro*]:
assumes *feasible X Y*
and $\nexists\, X'\ Y'.$ *feasible* $X'\ Y' \wedge X' \succ$*Pareto X*
shows *pareto-optimal X Y*
using *pareto-optimal-def assms*(*1*) *assms*(*2*) **by** *blast*

lemma *pareto-optimalD*[*dest*]:
assumes *pareto-optimal X Y*
shows *feasible X Y* **and** $\nexists\, X'\ Y'.$ *feasible* $X'\ Y' \wedge X' \succ$*Pareto X*
using *pareto-optimal-def assms* **by** *auto*

lemma *util-fun-def-holds*:
assumes $i \in$ *agents*
and $x \in$ *consumption-set*
and $y \in$ *consumption-set*
shows $x \succeq[Pr[i]]\ y \longleftrightarrow U[i]\ x \geq U[i]\ y$
proof
assume $x \succeq[Pr[i]]\ y$
show $U[i]\ x \geq U[i]\ y$
by (*meson* ‹$x \succeq[Pr[i]]\ y$› *agent-props assms eucl-ordinal-utility-def ordinal-utility-def*)

next
assume $U[i]\ x \geq U[i]\ y$
have *eucl-ordinal-utility consumption-set* $(Pr[i])$ $(U[i])$
by (*simp add*: *agent-props assms*)
then show $x \succeq[Pr[i]]\ y$
by (*meson* ‹$U[i]\ y \leq U[i]\ x$› *assms*(*2*) *assms*(*3*) *eucl-ordinal-utility-def ordinal-utility.util-def-conf*)
qed

lemma *base-pref-is-ord-eucl-rpr*: $i \in agents \Longrightarrow$ *rational-preference consumption-set* $Pr[i]$
using *agent-props ord-eucl-utility-imp-rpr real-vector-rpr.have-rpr* **by** *blast*

lemma *prof-max-ge-all-in-pset*:
assumes $j \in firms$
assumes $Y\ j \in$ *profit-maximisation* P (*production-sets j*)
shows $\forall\, y \in$ *production-sets j*. $P \cdot Y\ j \geq P \cdot y$
using *all-leq assms*(*2*) *profit-maximisation-def* **by** *fastforce*

9.5 Lemmas for final result

Strictly preferred bundles are strictly more expensive.

lemma *all-prefered-are-more-expensive*:
assumes *i-agt*: $i \in agents$
assumes *equil*: *competitive-equilibrium* $P\ \mathcal{X}\ \mathcal{Y}$
assumes $z \in$ *consumption-set*
assumes $(U\ i)\ z > (U\ i)\ (\mathcal{X}\ i)$
shows $z \cdot P > P \cdot (\mathcal{X}\ i)$
proof (*rule ccontr*)
assume *neg-as* : $\neg(z \cdot P > P \cdot (\mathcal{X}\ i))$
have *xp-leq* : $z \cdot P \leq P \cdot\ (\mathcal{X}\ i)$
using ‹$\neg z \cdot P > P \cdot (\mathcal{X}\ i)$› **by** *auto*
have *x-in-argmax*: $(\mathcal{X}\ i) \in$ *arg-max-set* $U[i]$ (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value* P) *consumption-set* (*poe-wealth* $P\ i\ \mathcal{Y}$))
using *equil i-agt* **by** *blast*
hence *x-in*: $\mathcal{X}\ i \in$ (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value* P) *consumption-set* (*poe-wealth* $P\ i\ \mathcal{Y}$))
using *argmax-sol-in-s* [*of* $(\mathcal{X}\ i)$ $U[i]$ *budget-constraint* (*calculate-value* P) *consumption-set* (*poe-wealth* $P\ i\ \mathcal{Y}$)]
by *blast*
hence *z-in-budget*: $z \in$ (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value* P) *consumption-set* (*poe-wealth* $P\ i\ \mathcal{Y}$))
proof −
have *z-leq-endow*: $P \cdot z \leq P \cdot (\mathcal{X}\ i)$
by (*metis xp-leq inner-commute*)
have *z-in-cons*: $z \in$ *consumption-set*
using *assms* **by** *auto*
then show *?thesis*
using *x-in budget-constraint-def z-leq-endow*

proof −
have $\forall r.\ \ P \cdot \mathcal{X}\ i \leq r \longrightarrow P \cdot z \leq r$
using *z-leq-endow* **by** *linarith*
then show *?thesis*
using *budget-constraint-def x-in z-in-cons*
by (*simp add*: *budget-constraint-def*)
qed
qed
have *nex-prop*: $\nexists e.\ e \in$ (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value P*) *consumption-set* (*poe-wealth P i* $\mathcal{Y}$)) $\wedge$
$U[i]\ e > U[i]\ (\mathcal{X}\ i)$
using *no-better-in-s*[*of* $\mathcal{X}$ *i U*[*i*]
budget-constraint (*calculate-value P*) *consumption-set* (*poe-wealth P i* $\mathcal{Y}$)] *x-in-argmax* **by** *blast*
have $z \in$ *budget-constraint* (*calculate-value P*) *consumption-set* (*poe-wealth P i* $\mathcal{Y}$) $\wedge$ $U[i]\ z > U[i]\ (\mathcal{X}\ i)$
using *assms z-in-budget* **by** *blast*
thus *False* **using** *nex-prop*
by *blast*
qed

Given local non-satiation, argmax will use the entire budget.

lemma *am-utilises-entire-bgt*:
assumes *i-agts*: $i \in$ *agents*
assumes *lns* : *local-nonsatiation consumption-set Pr*[*i*]
assumes *argmax-sol* : $X \in$ *arg-max-set U*[*i*] (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value P*) *consumption-set* (*poe-wealth P i Y*))
shows $P \cdot X = P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i] + (\sum j \in$ *firms*. $\Theta[i,j] *_R (P \cdot Y\ j))$
proof −
let *?wlt* $= P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i] + (\sum j \in$ *firms*. $\Theta[i,j] *_R (P \cdot Y\ j))$
let *?bc* = *budget-constraint* (*calculate-value P*) *consumption-set* (*poe-wealth P i Y*)
have *xin*: $X \in$ *budget-constraint* (*calculate-value P*) *consumption-set* (*poe-wealth P i Y*)
using *argmax-sol-in-s* [*of X U*[*i*] *?bc*] *argmax-sol* **by** *blast*
hence *is-leq*: $X \cdot P \leq$ (*poe-wealth P i Y*)
by (*metis* (*mono-tags*, *lifting*) *budget-constraint-def*
inner-commute mem-Collect-eq)
have *not-less*: $\neg X \cdot P <$ (*poe-wealth P i Y*)
proof
assume *neg*: $X \cdot P <$ (*poe-wealth P i Y*)
have *bgt-leq*: $\forall x \in$ *?bc*. $U[i]\ X \geq U[i]\ x$
using *leq-all-in-sol* [*of X U*[*i*] *?bc*]
all-leq [*of X U*[*i*] *?bc*]
argmax-sol **by** *blast*
define *s-low* **where**
s-low = $\{x\ .\ P \cdot x <$ *?wlt*$\}$
have $\exists e > 0.$ *ball X e* $\subseteq$ *s-low*
proof −

have *x-in-budget*: $P \cdot X < ?wlt$
by (*metis inner-commute neg*)
have *s-low-open*: *open s-low*
using *open-halfspace-lt s-low-def* **by** *blast*
then show *?thesis*
using *s-low-open open-contains-ball-eq*
s-low-def x-in-budget **by** *blast*
qed
obtain *e* **where**
$e > 0$ **and** *e*: *ball X e* $\subseteq$ *s-low*
using ‹$\exists$ *e*>*0*. *ball X e* $\subseteq$ *s-low*› **by** *blast*
obtain *y* **where**
y-props: $y \in$ *ball X e* $y \succ[Pref\ i]\ X$
using ‹*0* < *e*› *xin assms*(*2*) *budget-constraint-def*
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *lifting*) *lns-alt-def2 mem-Collect-eq*)
have $y \in$ *budget-constraint* (*calculate-value P*) *consumption-set* (*poe-wealth P i Y*)
proof −
have $y \in$ *s-low*
using ‹$y \in$ *ball X e*› *e* **by** *blast*
moreover have $y \in$ *consumption-set*
by (*meson agent-props eucl-ordinal-utility-def i-agts ordinal-utility-def y-props*(*2*))
moreover have $P \cdot y \leq$ *poe-wealth P i Y*
using *calculation*(*1*) *s-low-def* **by** *auto*
ultimately show *?thesis*
by (*simp add*: *budget-constraint-def*)
qed
then show *False*
using *bgt-leq i-agts y-props*(*2*) *util-fun-def-holds xin budget-constraint-def*
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *lifting*) *mem-Collect-eq*)
qed
then show *?thesis*
by (*metis inner-commute is-leq*
less-eq-real-def)
qed

corollary *x-equil-x-ext-budget*:
assumes *i-agt*: $i \in$ *agents*
assumes *lns* : *local-nonsatiation consumption-set Pr*[*i*]
assumes *equilibrium* : *competitive-equilibrium P X Y*
shows $P \cdot X\ i = P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i] + (\sum j \in firms.\ \Theta[i,j] *_R (P \cdot Y\ j))$
proof −
have *X i* $\in$ *arg-max-set U*[*i*] (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value P*) *consumption-set* (*poe-wealth P i Y*))
using *equilibrium i-agt* **by** *blast*
then show *?thesis*
using *am-utilises-entire-bgt i-agt lns* **by** *blast*
qed

lemma *same-price-in-argmax* :
assumes *i-agt*: $i \in agents$
assumes *lns* : *local-nonsatiation consumption-set* $Pr[i]$
assumes $x \in$ *arg-max-set* $(U[i])$ (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value* P) *consumption-set* (*poe-wealth* $P\ i\ Y$))
assumes $y \in$ *arg-max-set* $(U[i])$ (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value* P) *consumption-set* (*poe-wealth* $P\ i\ Y$))
shows $(P \cdot x) = (P \cdot y)$
using *am-utilises-entire-bgt assms lns*
by (*metis* (*no-types*) *am-utilises-entire-bgt assms*(*3*) *assms*(*4*) *i-agt lns*)

Greater or equal utility implies greater or equal value.

lemma *utility-ge-price-ge* :
assumes *agts*: $i \in agents$
assumes *lns* : *local-nonsatiation consumption-set* $Pr[i]$
assumes *equil*: *competitive-equilibrium* $P\ X\ Y$
assumes *geq*: $U[i]\ z \geq U[i]\ (X\ i)$
and $z \in$ *consumption-set*
shows $P \cdot z \geq P \cdot (X\ i)$
proof −
let *?bc* = (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value* P) *consumption-set* (*poe-wealth* $P\ i\ Y$))
have *not-in* : $z \notin$ *arg-max-set* $(U[i])$ *?bc* $\Longrightarrow$
$P \cdot z > (P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i]) + (\sum j \in (firms).\ (\Theta[i,j] *_R (P \cdot Y\ j)))$
proof−
assume $z \notin$ *arg-max-set* $(U[i])$ *?bc*
moreover have $X\ i \in$ *arg-max-set* $(U[i])$ *?bc*
using *competitive-equilibriumD assms pareto-optimal-def*
by *auto*
ultimately have $z \notin$ *budget-constraint* (*calculate-value* P) *consumption-set* (*poe-wealth* $P\ i\ Y$)
by (*meson geq leq-all-in-sol*)
then show *?thesis*
using *budget-constraint-def assms*
by (*simp add*: *budget-constraint-def*)
qed
have *x-in-argmax*: $(X\ i) \in$ *arg-max-set* $U[i]$ *?bc*
using *agts equil* **by** *blast*
hence *x-in-budget*: $(X\ i) \in$ *?bc*
using *argmax-sol-in-s* [*of* $(X\ i)$ $U[i]$ *?bc*] **by** *blast*
have $U[i]\ z = U[i]\ (X\ i) \Longrightarrow P \cdot z \geq P \cdot (X\ i)$
proof(*rule contrapos-pp*)
assume *con-neg*: $\neg\ P \cdot z \geq P \cdot (X\ i)$
then have $P \cdot z < P \cdot (X\ i)$
by *linarith*
then have *z-in-argmax*: $z \in$ *arg-max-set* $U[i]$ *?bc*
proof −
have $P \cdot (X\ i) = P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i] + (\sum j \in firms.\ \Theta[i,j] *_R (P \cdot Y\ j))$

using *agts am-utilises-entire-bgt lns x-in-argmax* **by** *blast*
then show *?thesis*
by (*metis* (*no-types*) *con-neg less-eq-real-def not-in*)
qed
have *z-budget-utilisation*: $P \cdot z = P \cdot (X\ i)$
by (*metis* (*no-types*) *agts am-utilises-entire-bgt lns x-in-argmax z-in-argmax*)
have $P \cdot (X\ i) = P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i] + (\sum j{\in}firms.\ \Theta[i,j] *_R (P \cdot Y\ j))$
using *agts am-utilises-entire-bgt lns x-in-argmax* **by** *blast*
show $\neg\ U[i]\ z = U[i]\ (X\ i)$
using *z-budget-utilisation con-neg* **by** *linarith*
qed
thus *?thesis*
by (*metis* (*no-types*) *agts am-utilises-entire-bgt eq-iff eucl-less-le-not-le lns not-in x-in-argmax*)
qed

lemma *commutativity-sums-over-funs*:
fixes $X :: 'x\ set$
fixes $Y :: 'y\ set$
shows $(\sum i{\in}X.\ \sum j{\in}Y.\ (f\ i\ j *_R C \cdot g\ j)) = (\sum j{\in}Y.\sum i{\in}X.\ (f\ i\ j *_R C \cdot g\ j))$
using *Groups-Big.comm-monoid-add-class.sum.swap* **by** *auto*

lemma *assoc-fun-over-sum*:
fixes $X :: 'x\ set$
fixes $Y :: 'y\ set$
shows $(\sum j{\in}Y.\ \sum i{\in}X.\ f\ i\ j *_R C \cdot g\ j) = (\sum j{\in}Y.\ (\sum i{\in}X.\ f\ i\ j) *_R C \cdot g\ j)$
by (*simp add*: *inner-sum-left scaleR-left.sum*)

Walras' law in context of production economy with private ownership. That is, in an equilibrium demand equals supply.

lemma *walras-law*:
assumes $\bigwedge i.\ i{\in}agents \Longrightarrow$ *local-nonsatiation consumption-set Pr*[*i*]
assumes $(\forall\, i \in agents.\ (X\ i) \in$ *arg-max-set U*[*i*] (*budget-constraint* (*calculate-value P*) *consumption-set* (*poe-wealth P i Y*)))
shows $P \cdot (\sum i{\in}agents.\ (X\ i)) = P \cdot ((\sum i{\in}agents.\ \mathcal{E}[i]) + (\sum j{\in}firms.\ Y\ j))$
proof −
have *value-equal*: $P \cdot (\sum i{\in}agents.\ (X\ i)) = P \cdot (\sum i{\in}agents.\ \mathcal{E}[i]) + (\sum i{\in}agents.\ \sum f{\in}firms.\ \Theta[i,f] *_R (P \cdot Y\ f))$
proof −
have *all-exhaust-bgt*: $\forall\, i{\in}agents.\ P \cdot (X\ i) = P \cdot \mathcal{E}[i] + (\sum j{\in}firms.\ \Theta[i,j] *_R (P \cdot (Y\ j)))$
using *assms am-utilises-entire-bgt* **by** *blast*
then show *?thesis*
by (*simp add*:*all-exhaust-bgt inner-sum-right sum.distrib*)
qed
have *eq-1*: $(\sum i{\in}agents.\ \sum j{\in}firms.\ (\Theta[i,j] *_R P \cdot Y\ j)) = (\sum j{\in}firms.\ \sum i{\in}agents.\ (\Theta[i,j] *_R P \cdot Y\ j))$
using *commutativity-sums-over-funs* [*of* Θ *P Y firms agents*] **by** *blast*
hence *eq-2*: $P \cdot (\sum i{\in}agents.\ X\ i) = P \cdot (\sum i{\in}agents.\ \mathcal{E}[i]) + (\sum j{\in}firms.$

$\sum i{\in}agents.\ \Theta[i,j] *_R P \cdot Y\ j$)
using *value-equal* **by** *auto*
also have *eq-3*: $...= P \cdot (\sum i{\in}agents.\ \mathcal{E}[i]) + (\sum j{\in}firms.\ (\sum i{\in}agents.\ \Theta[i,j]) *_R P \cdot Y\ j$)
using *assoc-fun-over-sum*[*of* Θ *P Y agents firms*] **by** *auto*
also have *eq-4*: $... = P \cdot (\sum i{\in}agents.\ \mathcal{E}[i]) + (\sum f{\in}firms.\ P \cdot Y\ f)$
using *firms-comp-owned* **by** *auto*
have *comp-wise-inner*: $P \cdot (\sum i{\in}agents.\ X\ i) - (P \cdot (\sum i{\in}agents.\ \mathcal{E}[i])) - (\sum f{\in}firms.\ P \cdot Y\ f) = 0$
using *eq-1 eq-2 eq-3 eq-4* **by** *linarith*
then show *?thesis*
by (*simp add*: *inner-right-distrib inner-sum-right*)
qed

lemma *walras-law-in-compeq*:
assumes $\bigwedge i.\ i{\in}agents \Longrightarrow$ *local-nonsatiation consumption-set* $Pr[i]$
assumes *competitive-equilibrium P X Y*
shows $P \cdot ((\sum i{\in}agents.\ (X\ i)) - (\sum i{\in}agents.\ \mathcal{E}[i]) - (\sum j{\in}firms.\ Y\ j)) = 0$
proof–
have $P \cdot (\sum i{\in}agents.\ (X\ i)) = P \cdot ((\sum i{\in}agents.\ \mathcal{E}[i]) + (\sum j{\in}firms.\ Y\ j))$
using *assms*(*1*) *assms*(*2*) *walras-law* **by** *auto*
then show *?thesis*
by (*simp add*: *inner-diff-right inner-right-distrib*)
qed

9.6 First Welfare Theorem

Proof of First Welfare Theorem in context of production economy with private ownership.

theorem *first-welfare-theorem-priv-own*:
assumes $\bigwedge i.\ i \in agents \Longrightarrow$ *local-nonsatiation consumption-set* $Pr[i]$
and $Price > 0$
assumes *competitive-equilibrium Price* $\mathcal{X}\ \mathcal{Y}$
shows *pareto-optimal* $\mathcal{X}\ \mathcal{Y}$
proof (*rule ccontr*)
assume *neg-as*: $\neg$ *pareto-optimal* $\mathcal{X}\ \mathcal{Y}$
have *equili-feasible* : *feasible* $\mathcal{X}\ \mathcal{Y}$
using *assms* **by** (*simp add*: *competitive-equilibrium-def*)
obtain $X'\ Y'$ **where**
xprime-pareto: *feasible* $X'\ Y' \wedge$
$(\forall i \in agents.\ U[i]\ (X'\ i) \geq U[i]\ (\mathcal{X}\ i)) \wedge$
$(\exists i \in agents.\ U[i]\ (X'\ i) > U[i]\ (\mathcal{X}\ i))$
using *equili-feasible pareto-optimal-def*
pareto-dominating-def neg-as **by** *auto*
have *is-feasible*: *feasible* $X'\ Y'$
using *xprime-pareto* **by** *blast*
have *xprime-leq-y*: $\forall i \in agents.\ (Price \cdot (X'\ i) \geq$
$(Price \cdot \mathcal{E}[i]) + (\sum j{\in}(firms).\ \Theta[i,j] *_R (Price \cdot \mathcal{Y}\ j)))$
proof

fix i
assume *as*: $i \in$ *agents*
have *xprime-cons*: $X'\ i \in$ *consumption-set*
using *feasible-private-ownershipD as is-feasible* **by** *blast*
have *x-leq-xprime*: $U[i]\ (X'\ i) \geq U[i]\ (\mathcal{X}\ i)$
using ‹$i \in$ *agents*› *xprime-pareto* **by** *blast*
have *lns-pref*: *local-nonsatiation consumption-set* $Pr[i]$
using *as assms* **by** *blast*
hence *xprime-ge-x*: $Price \cdot (X'\ i) \geq Price \cdot (\mathcal{X}\ i)$
using *x-leq-xprime xprime-cons as assms utility-ge-price-ge* **by** *blast*
then show $Price \cdot (X'\ i) \geq (Price \cdot \mathcal{E}[i]) + (\sum j{\in}(firms).\ \Theta[i,j] *_R (Price \cdot \mathcal{Y}\ j))$
using *xprime-ge-x* ‹$i \in$ *agents*› *lns-pref assms x-equil-x-ext-budget* **by** *fastforce*
qed
have *ex-greater-value* : $\exists\, i \in$ *agents*. $Price \cdot (X'\ i) > Price \cdot (\mathcal{X}\ i)$
proof(*rule ccontr*)
assume *cpos* : $\neg(\exists\, i \in$ *agents*. $Price \cdot (X'\ i) > Price \cdot (\mathcal{X}\ i))$
obtain i **where**
obt-witness : $i \in$ *agents* $(U[i])\ (X'\ i) > U[i]\ (\mathcal{X}\ i)$
using *xprime-pareto* **by** *blast*
show *False*
by (*metis all-prefered-are-more-expensive assms*(*3*) *cpos*
feasible-private-ownershipD(*2*) *inner-commute xprime-pareto*)
qed
have *dom-g* : $Price \cdot (\sum i{\in}agents.\ X'\ i) > Price \cdot (\sum i{\in}agents.\ (\mathcal{X}\ i))$ (**is** - > - · *?x-sum*)
proof−
have $(\sum i{\in}agents.\ Price \cdot X'\ i) > (\sum i{\in}agents.\ Price \cdot (\mathcal{X}\ i))$
by (*metis* (*mono-tags*, *lifting*) *xprime-leq-y assms*(*1,3*) *ex-greater-value*
finite-nonepty-agents sum-strict-mono-ex1 x-equil-x-ext-budget)
thus $Price \cdot (\sum i{\in}agents.\ X'\ i) > Price \cdot$ *?x-sum*
by (*simp add*: *inner-sum-right*)
qed
let *?y-sum* = $(\sum j{\in}firms.\ \mathcal{Y}\ j)$
have *equili-walras-law*: $Price \cdot$ *?x-sum* =
$(\sum i{\in}agents.\ Price \cdot \mathcal{E}[i] + (\sum j{\in}firms.\ \Theta[i,j] *_R (Price \cdot \mathcal{Y}\ j)))$ (**is** - = *?ws*)
proof−
have $\forall\, i{\in}agents.\ Price \cdot \mathcal{X}\ i = Price \cdot \mathcal{E}[i] + (\sum j{\in}firms.\ \Theta[i,j] *_R (Price \cdot \mathcal{Y}\ j))$
by (*metis* (*no-types*, *lifting*) *assms*(*1,3*) *x-equil-x-ext-budget*)
then show *?thesis*
by (*simp add*: *inner-sum-right*)
qed
also have *remove-firm-pct*: ... = $Price \cdot (\sum i{\in}agents.\ \mathcal{E}[i]) + (Price \cdot$ *?y-sum*)
proof−
have *equals-inner-price*:*0* = $Price \cdot (?x\text{-}sum - ((\sum i{\in}agents.\ \mathcal{E}\ i) +$ *?y-sum*))
by (*metis* (*no-types*) *diff-diff-add assms*(*1,3*) *walras-law-in-compeq*)
have $Price \cdot$ *?x-sum* = $Price \cdot ((\sum i{\in}agents.\ \mathcal{E}\ i) +$ *?y-sum*)
by (*metis* (*no-types*) *equals-inner-price inner-diff-right right-minus-eq*)

then show *?thesis*
by (*simp add*: *equili-walras-law inner-right-distrib*)
qed
have *xp-l-yp*: $(\sum i{\in}agents.\ X'\ i) \leq (\sum i{\in}agents.\ \mathcal{E}[i]) + (\sum f{\in}firms.\ Y'\ f)$
using *feasible-private-ownership-def is-feasible* **by** *blast*
hence *yprime-sgr-y*: $Price \cdot (\sum i{\in}agents.\ \mathcal{E}[i]) + Price \cdot (\sum f{\in}firms.\ Y'\ f) >$ *?ws*
proof −
have $Price \cdot (\sum i{\in}agents.\ X'\ i) \leq Price \cdot ((\sum i{\in}agents.\ \mathcal{E}[i]) + (\sum j{\in}firms.\ Y'\ j))$
by (*metis xp-l-yp atLeastAtMost-iff inner-commute interval-inner-leI*(*2*) *less-imp-le order-refl assms*(*2*))
hence *?ws* $< Price \cdot ((\sum i{\in}agents.\ \mathcal{E}\ i) + (\sum j{\in}firms.\ Y'\ j))$
using *dom-g equili-walras-law* **by** *linarith*
then show *?thesis*
by (*simp add*: *inner-right-distrib*)
qed
have *Y-is-optimum*: $\forall\, j{\in}firms.\ \forall\, y \in production\text{-}sets\ j.\ Price \cdot \mathcal{Y}\ j \geq Price \cdot y$
using *assms prof-max-ge-all-in-pset* **by** *blast*
have *yprime-in-prod-set*: $\forall\, j \in firms.\ Y'\ j \in production\text{-}sets\ j$
using *feasible-private-ownershipD xprime-pareto* **by** *fastforce*
hence $\forall\, j \in firms.\ \forall\, y \in production\text{-}sets\ j.\ Price \cdot \mathcal{Y}\ j \geq Price \cdot y$
using *Y-is-optimum* **by** *blast*
hence *Y-ge-yprime*: $\forall\, j \in firms.\ Price \cdot \mathcal{Y}\ j \geq Price \cdot Y'\ j$
using *yprime-in-prod-set* **by** *blast*
hence *yprime-p-leq-Y*: $Price \cdot (\sum f{\in}firms.\ Y'\ f) \leq Price \cdot$ *?y-sum*
by (*simp add*: *Y-ge-yprime inner-sum-right sum-mono*)
then show *False*
using *remove-firm-pct yprime-sgr-y* **by** *linarith*
qed

Equilibrium cannot be Pareto dominated.

lemma *equilibria-dom-eachother*:
assumes $\bigwedge i.\ i \in agents \Longrightarrow local\text{-}nonsatiation\ consumption\text{-}set\ Pr[i]$
and $Price > 0$
assumes *equil*: *competitive-equilibrium Price* $\mathcal{X}\ \mathcal{Y}$
shows $\nexists\, X'\ Y'.\ competitive\text{-}equilibrium\ P\ X'\ Y' \wedge X' \succ Pareto\ \mathcal{X}$
proof −
have *pareto-optimal* $\mathcal{X}\ \mathcal{Y}$
by (*meson equil first-welfare-theorem-priv-own assms*)
hence $\nexists\, X'\ Y'.\ feasible\ X'\ Y' \wedge X' \succ Pareto\ \mathcal{X}$
using *pareto-optimal-def* **by** *blast*
thus *?thesis*
by *auto*
qed

Using monotonicity instead of local non-satiation proves the First Welfare Theorem.

corollary *first-welfare-thm-monotone*:

assumes $\forall M \in \mathit{carrier}.\ (\forall x > M.\ x \in \mathit{carrier})$
assumes $\bigwedge i.\ i \in \mathit{agents} \Longrightarrow \mathit{monotone\text{-}preference\ consumption\text{-}set\ Pr}[i]$
and $\mathit{Price} > 0$
assumes $\mathit{competitive\text{-}equilibrium\ Price}\ \mathcal{X}\ \mathcal{Y}$
shows $\mathit{pareto\text{-}optimal}\ \mathcal{X}\ \mathcal{Y}$
by (*meson arrow-debreu-consum-set-def assms cons-set-props first-welfare-theorem-priv-own unbounded-above-mono-imp-lns*)

end

end

end

10 Related work

[2]

References

[1] K. J. Arrow, A. Sen, and K. Suzumura. *Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare*, volume 2. Elsevier, 2010.

[2] S. Tadelis. *Game Theory: An Introduction*. Princeton University Press, 2013.